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Summary 
The thesis contains 5 independent papers togeth~r with an 
introduction and a general conclusion. All five papers 
consider private information in simple oligopoly models with 
linear demand and cost functions. The problem to be analysed 
is the extend to which private information is transmitted 
between firms and the concequences thereof. In principle the 
transmission (or dissemination) can take place voluntarily or 
involuntarily. In the case of voluntary information 
transmission (or sharing) we assume that this is done 
honestly. One of the main results in this strand of the 
literature is that firms have no incentives to share 
information unless they _can collude over strategies. In 
chapter II and III we show that this conclusion is not 
generally true. 
In chapter II we consider the incentive- for' risk-averse firms 
to share their private information. We show that the 
assumption of risk-aversion in some cases reverse the 
conclusion in the literature. In chapter III we show that 
there are cases in which private information and the sharing 
thereof within a collusive arrangement prove detrimental to 
the size of a stable collusive arrangement. Thus in some 
cases private information imply a disincentive to collude. 
Chapter IV and V looks at the effect of uncertainty and 
private information on a two-~tage duopoly model in which 
firms first choose capacity. then compete over prices. In 
chapter IV we show that no pure strategy equilibrium exists 
regardless of whether uncertainty is resolved before or after 
capacity is chosen. A mixed strategy equilibrium is shown to 
exist. and the equilibrium is worked out for a specific 
distribution of the random varia,.ble. In chapter V we modify 
the equilibrium concept by i~posing a no-mill-price-
undercutting rule. We shown that if firms' capacities differ. 
the firm with the highest capacity endogeneously sets the 
higher price. Examples of private-asymmetric information are 
considered and the main finding _f~om the examples are that 
there are cases where neither firm wants to share the 
information of the best informed: 
Chapter VI which is joint- work with Norman J. Ireland 
considers involuntary information transmission via output 
plans. This allows us to rationalise positive consistent 
conjectures in a simple oligopoly model. 
General for all the models considered is that the results not 
only differ from those f~und under certainty. but also that 
the results are possibly non-robust. especially with regards 
to changes in information structures and functional forms. 
-1-
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION. 
-2-
The introduction of uncertainty into models of industrial 
organisation is becomming more and more widespread. no doubt 
due to its obvious relevance. Not only are firms subject to 
an uncertain environment. They base their decisions in part 
on information which is private or particular to that firm. 
Firms may know their own local demand. local wages. their own 
technology better that they know that of their competitors. 
The effect of private information has been analysed 
extensively in models with many agents. see Grossman(1981) 
for an overview. The analysis of cases where firms are few 
has only recently been undertaken. no doubt facilitated by 
the more and more readily available techniques for solving 
these models under various informational assumptions. In this 
respect. the emergence of the Rational Expectations solution 
techniques has been important. In deterministic models of 
imperfect competition we normally assume that firms take into 
consideration the reactions of other firms when choosing 
their own strategy. Under uncertainty. and especially when 
firms have private information. the assumption that firms use 
their information consistently when forming expectations is 
natural. 
What makes the oligopoly models difficult to solve when firms 
have private information is that a firm must have a 
conjecture about both how the other firms react to its 
strategies and how they react to their own private 
information. This is brought out clearly in the models on 
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learning. (e.g. Cyert and DeGroot(1974). Kirman(1975.1983) ). 
where firms are uncertain about their residual demand 
function. Their private information is the historical data on 
their own output level and price. The main result from their 
models is that. if firms start out with a misspecified model 
of their residual demand they may never learn the true model. 
but they may converge to a self-fulfilling belief which 
differs from the true model. 
Other oligopoly models with uncertainty have been analysed by 
Basar and Ho(1974). Levine and Ponssard(1979). Ponssard(1979) 
and Sakai(1984.1985). 
In a duopoly model with linear demand, having random 
intercept, Basar and Ho(1974) shows the existence and 
uniqueness of affine equilibrium strategies when firms 
observe a linear signal on a random variable. Levine and 
Ponssard(1979) considers the value of information in two-
player zero-sum games. They show that information has a value 
to the player. Ponssard(1979) considers a n-firm oligopoly 
model where firms producing a homogeneous good are faced with 
a linear inverse demand curve with random intercept. There 
are two types of firms, informed and uninformed. A Cournot-
Nash equilibrium is shown to exist with expected profits of 
the informed being an increasing function of the number of 
informed firms. Information is showed to have a positive 
value. Sakai(1985) considers a simple duopoly model to 
evaluate information in the case where cost functions are 
subject to uncertainty. Firms can gather information about 
-4-
its own costs. the costs of its opponent. the costs of both 
or nothing at all. Firms are assumed risk-neutral Cournot 
players. Whether or not information has a value depends on 
the size of the variance of costs and their correlation. If 
costs are positively correlated more information may be 
harmfull to the firms. Sakai(1984) considers a model like the 
above. only now one of the players is assumed to be a 
Stackelberg leader. Again information is shown to have a 
value. In deriving the results. it is assumed that the 
follower does not learn the information of the leader. This 
should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. 
Private information may get disseminated via firm behaviour. 
This has been considered within models of competition where 
dissemination typically takes place via the price system (for 
a survey of dissemination of information in competitive 
financial markets. see Andersen(1985». Dissemination of 
information is more likely to take place in industries with 
few firms because these firms exercise a greater influence on 
each other and hence have a greater incentive to monitor each 
others actions. 
It is this aspect of oligopoly models with uncertainty which 
is considered in this thesis. i.e. the extend to which 
private information is transmitted between firms in 
industries where the number of firms is small. Private 
information can in principle be transmitted in two ways. 
voluntarily and involuntarily. 
-5-
By voluntary information transmission we understand 
situations where one firm, either directly or through a third 
party transmit all or part of its information to another 
firm. It is assumed throughout that the information 
transmitted this way should be true. One possible 
interpretation is that firms submit their information to a 
third party - an auditor - who discards all untrue 
information, or who can punish a lying firm sufficiently hard 
to ensure truth-telling. The models which have sofar been 
analysed in the literature, and the models which will be 
analysed in the following are all essentially one-period 
models (as goods are only traded once, the two-stage models 
in chapters IV and V can be seen as covering only one, albeit 
long, period in time). These models are not well suited to 
analyse deceptive information transmission because all firms 
have an incentive to overstate bad news and understate good 
news. Hence they will never be believed or the extend of 
deception can be unravelled by the others. We are thus not 
concerned with information as a mean to decieve others. 
Rather we try to see to what extend truthfull information is 
beneficial. Another argument in favour of doing this is that, 
if information transmission was beneficial conditional on the 
information being true, then surely these firms would set up 
a body or an institution to ensure this. Further, often such 
third parties do exists (e.g. trade associations and 
statistical offices). Hence what may seem as involuntary 
information transmission may be a way of implementing 
truthful information transmission, necessary because, 
although voluntary information transmission was beneficial in 
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the first place, truthtelling cannot be insured. Some of the 
services of the statistical office could possibly be 
interpreted in this way. 
One might ask why a firm would want to share its private 
information with its competitors. Firstly it allows firms to 
follow demand more closely as well as allowing for more 
efficient production. Secondly, it may facilitate informal 
collusive arrangements as these become easier to monitor. One 
might expect that information transmission is more likely to 
be preferred if the private information is about demand 
factors (at times referred to as public variables, as they 
affect all firms directly) exactly because this directly 
enables firms to follow demand more closely and to choose a 
more efficient production process. On the other hand firms 
may be less willing if the private information is about some 
aspect of the firms cost or technology (often referred to as 
private variables as they only affect others indirectly), 
because firms might give away information which would put 
them at a strong disadvantage in e.g. price wars. A repor~ by 
the Danish monopoly authorities has more than once been 
suppressed at the wish of the firms in question, because it 
contained too detailed information on technology and cost-
structures in an industry. 
As it turns out the results in the literature differs 
markedly from this. A series of papers: Clarke{1983a,b), Gal-
Or{1985a,1986), Li(1986), Novshek and Sonnenshein(1982) and 
Vives(1984) have considered 'the incentives to share 
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information. The standard assumptions of these models, which 
will also to a large extend be made use of in the thesis, 
are: (a) Linear demand function. (b) Constant marginal costs. 
(c) Either random demand intercept or random marginal costs 
about which each firm recieve a signal. (d) The expectations 
of the random variable conditional on the signal is linear in 
the signal. (e) The decision to share is made before 
recieving the signal and firms can commit themselves to share 
honestly. 
In a model with normal distributed random intercept and 
normal distributed signals, Novshek and Sonnenshein(1982) 
found that firms were indifferent between sharing all their 
information and no sharing at all. They consider fulfilled 
expectations (Bayesian-Nash) equilibrium. Clarke(1983a) 
showed that the result hinged on the strong equilibrium 
concept which required that firms ex-ante market expectations 
were realised ex-post. Clarke(1983a) and the papers which 
followed used the less restrictive Bayesian-Nash (or rational 
expectations) equilibrium which only requires that decisions 
are based on best Bayes estimates of the other firms 
information. Clarke(1983a) found that firms in general had no 
incentives to share information. Clarke(1983b) generalised 
this to a n-firm oligopoly model and showed that there is 
never a mutual incentive for all firms in the industry to 
share their information unless they may cooperate on their 
strategy choice once information has been shared. Vives(1984) 
generalised the model to the case of symmetric differentiated 
goods. He-showed that if goods are complements, or in the 
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conventional case of competitive goods, if firms were price 
setters then firms have an incentive to share information. 
Gal-Or(1985) generalised Clarke(1983b) to the case where 
signals may be correlated and firms are allowed partial 
revelation of their information. Still firms have no 
incentives to share information. Finally Li(1986) generalised 
the results to allow for all distributions for which the 
posterior expectation is linear in the recieved signal. 
In a Cournot model with random marginal costs and a perfect 
signal on own costs, Okada(1982) showed that each firm would 
choose to reveal its private cost information to its rival. 
Gal-Or(1986) extended this to allow noisy signals and partial 
revelation and showed that firms have an incentive to share 
information if goods are substitutes and firms quantity 
setters, or if goods are complements and firms price setter •. 
Thus Gal-Or reverse the results found in Vives(1984). 
Shapiro(1986) generalised the model to an-firm Cournot 
oligopoly and cases of asymmetry across firms. Shapiro also 
explicitly modelled the incentives of firms to join a trade 
association that exchanged cost information. Li(1986) 
extended Shapiro(1986) by showing that perfect revelation is 
the unique equilibrium. 
Finally Harris and Lewis(1982) consider a two-stage duopoly 
model where firms first choose investment and then output 
level. A priori firms are uncertain about the intercept in a 
common linear demand function. Prior to choosing investment 
firms observe a positively correlated signal on the random 
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variable. Prior to choosing output. the realisation of the 
random variable is made known to both. They show the 
existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy equilibrium. 
Among other they find that firms may not be better off by 
observing a more precise signal and that firms prefer the 
signal to be a bit noisy. Further. if the signals are 
positively correlated. then more precise signals are 
preferred. the reverse is true when signals are negatively 
correlated. This also implies that the incentive to share 
information diminishes as the correlation between signals 
decrease and become negative. 
The thesis contains five major chapters together with this 
introduction and a short conclusion. In chapter II we show 
that the results that there are no incentives for sharing 
demand information may be reversed if firms are risk-averse 
because in that case information sharing benefits firms as it 
reduces the variance of the random variables. Assuming that 
firms have constant absolute risk aversion. we identify cases 
where firms prefer to share information. This result does not 
necessarily require that the firms are very risk averse. i.e. 
that their utility function is very concave. This indicates 
that the results in the literature may hinge on the 
functional forms. Further in a working paper Nalebuff and 
Zeckhauser(1986) show that the results also hinges on the 
assumed information structure. All in all this implies that 
the results should be interpreted with care. 
In chapter-III we take up the point of Clarke that firms only 
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share information if they can coordinate their strategy 
choice. To shed some light on this we consider a model with 
endogeneous cartel formation. We identify cases where private 
information caused a disincentive to cartel formation. These 
cases were those where the cartel cannot avoid disseminating 
most of the shared information to firms not in the cartel. 
The main implication of this is that information sharing may 
be detrimental to collusive arrangements and we cannot be 
sure that information sharing leads to a greater degree of 
collusion. 
In chapter IV and V we consider a two-stage model in which 
firms first choose capacity. then prices. In this model both 
voluntary and involuntary information transmission is 
possible because the strategy choice in the first stage may 
contain information. Chapter IV contains the analysis of a 
two stage model under uncertainty. It is shown that no pure 
strategy equilibrium exists. A mixed strategy exists. and 
this is worked out for a specific distribution of the random 
variable. 
Chapter V invokes a more sophisticated conjecture on behalf 
of the firms which ensures that a pure strategy equilibrium 
exists. In.solving this model.we show that if capacity is 
exogeneously given. an '-.dogeneous Stackelberg leader exist. 
We consider asymmetric information and show that the best 
informed do-not. in general want to share its information with 
the worse informed. But more surprising .there are cases where 
the worse informed do not want to have the information of the 
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other firm. It seems to be the case that both firms prefer 
both to be totally ignorant in the first stage because this 
biases the capacities downwards, and totally informed in the 
second stage as this ensures an efficient choice of prices. 
The transmission of information involuntarily is interesting 
as firms do use resources on monitoring competitors, and 
resources are spent on industrial espionage. We therefore 
attempt to model situations where firms via their plans 
transmit part or all of their information. In a joint paper 
with Norman J. Ireland, chapter VI, we show that if firms can 
learn each others output plans, we can rationalise positive 
consistent conjectures even in a simple model. This result 
comes about because a production plan carries two messages. 
Firstly how much the firm plans to produce and secondly how 
the firm views the strength of the market demand. Hence a 
firm may be so heartened by an expansive plans of the other 
firms that it itself increase its actual output. 
In. summary, we have shown that private information and the 
transmission thereof can have very marked effects on the 
results of even simple duopoly and oligopoly models. A major 
problem in these models is the difficulty in solving even the 
most simple cases. Even more troublesome is the fact that 
changes in functional forms, information sets or stochastic 
formulations may have quite dramatic effects on the results. 
This is borne out by even a small degree of risk aversion 
reversing the results in the literature. This would seem to 
suggest that the selection of models are (more than ever) an 
-12-
empirical matter. Whereas this is to a large extend true, the 
models analysed in this thesis point to some severe problems 
with empirical analysis. This we shall return to in chapter 
VII which contains the general conclusions. 
-13-
CHAPTER II 
Risk-Averse Duopolists and Voluntary 
Information Transmission. 
-14-
1. Introduction. 
In the literature it is by now well established that Cournot 
duopolists producing a homogeneous good do not wish to share 
information about a random element in demand if they are 
constrained to acting non-cooperatively. see e.g. 
Clarke{1983a.b}. Gal-Or{1985a}. Li(1985} and Vives{1984}. 
Clarke{1983b} concludes: 
"If all industry firms are observed to pool 
information without paying each other compensation. 
they must be setting quantities cooperatively on 
the basis of the homogenized information. Hence 
information-pooling mechanisms like trade 
associations can be considered prima facie evidence 
that firms are illegally cooperating to restrict 
output". (Clarke. 1983b. p.392. his italics} 
This seems a very strong conclusion to draw from a very simple 
model. One of the simplifying assumptions of the previous 
models is that firms are risk-neutral. Hence firms do not gain 
explicitly from the reduced variance in the conditional 
expectations of the random variable after information has been 
shared. By introducing risk aversion the conclusion may be 
reversed. 
we consider a simple model of two firms producing a homogeneous 
good and facing a demand curve having a random intercept. Firms 
are assumep.to choose their output level to maximise expected 
utility of profits. Fo~ simplicity. we assume that firms have 
constant absolute risk aversion. Prior to choosing output each 
firm observe a private signal on the stochastic parameter. This 
-15-
is common knowledge. It is the information contained in this 
signal which firms may share. 
In solving the model, we will be looking for Bayesian-Nash (or 
rational expectations) equilibria. The problem is that, when 
firms have private information, firms must form expectations 
(or conjectures) about how other firms react to their own 
private information. In the literature it is commonplace to 
require that e~pect~tions are rational in the sense that they 
are not rejected ex post. In the context of voluntary 
infbT~ation sharing, firms cannot evaluate the effects of 
sharing if they have no expectations as to how the other firms 
react to the new information. The requirement of rational (or 
consistent) expectations is naturally extreme, but there seem 
at present no serious alternative. 
By way of solving the model, we also consider the effect of 
uncertainty and private information on risk-averse duopolists. 
The setup allows us to consider two special cases. The case 
where firms observes a perfect signal corresponds to the case 
where firms are informed about the realisation of the 
stochastic parameter prior to choosing output. The case where 
firms ~b~~rves a useless sign~l corresponds to the case where 
firms receives no information on the realisation until after 
their output choice. 
The chapter is o!ganised as follows. In section 2 we set up and 
solve the model. In section 3 we consider the incentives for 
firms to share their private information. Two cases are 
-16-
considered. In the first, section 3.1, a firm cannot obtain the 
information of the other firm unless it submits its own 
information. The question asked is whether it is in the common 
interest of the firms to share information. In the second case, 
section 3.2, we consider unilatteral information sharing, 
establishing whether it is in the private interest of a firm to 
share its information with the other firm. An affirmative 
answer in the second case naturally constitutes a stronger 
result than in the ~irs~ case. Note, though, that if firms have 
a public but not private incentive to share information, there 
must be incentives to set up an institution or a third party, 
which can enforce that both firms share their information. 
Section 4 concludes. 
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2. The model. 
Consider the following duopoly model with imperfect 
information. Demand is given by: 
- 2 
a - N(a,a ). 
a 
where q~ is output of firm i. a can be interpreted as the 
1 
(1) 
firms' prior estimate o~ a. ,Costs are assumed constant per unit 
and subsumed in a. Assume that firms are risk averse and assume 
that they maximise expected utility of profits given their 
information. We choose the simplest form of utility function. 
If firms have constant absolute risk aversion, this corresponds 
to firms maximising: 
i=l,2 (2) 
with respect to qi' where Ii is the information set of firm i, 
and a is a positive constant, the Arrow-Pratt measure of the 
degree of absolute risk aversion, for simplicity and symmetry 
assumed identical for both firms. 
Given (1) we can write (2) as: 
-18-
First order conditions associated with this are: 
i=I.2 (4) 
In accordance with the literature on information sharing. 
assume that firm i observes a private signal on a prior to 
choosing its output level. The signals of the firms are 
uncorrelated and are both unbiased estimators of a. They are 
given by 
i=I.2 (5) 
2 
where ~i ~ N(O.a~} and COV(~I'~2}=O. These signals could be 
interpreted as private forecasts. As a and ~i are both normal. 
the distribution of a conditional on the signal is normal and 
given by:l} 
(6) 
where 
2 
a 
t a = 2 2 
a + a 
{7} 
a ~ 
Note that t is a measure of the precision {or quality} of the 
private infor~ation. The closer is t to 1. the more precise is 
the signal. The information set of firm i when no information 
is shared then become Ii = {Si}. Given this we can write (4) as 
-19-
(8) 
As a is assumed normal. variances and covariances are 
independent of the realisations of the stochastic variables. 
The actual observation of Si does not alter the variance of a. 
The variance is affected by the knowledge that a signal of the 
form (5) will be observed. Hence. from (8). qi is a linear 
function of the conditional expectations of a and qj. This 
makes the conjecture that a firm·s choice of output is linear 
in its signal reasonable. 2 ) Specifically. assume that firm i 
expects firm j·s output to depend linearly on its information 
in the following way: 
c -a + o c -(S -a) 1 j 
where Co and c l are positive constants whos value is to be 
determined below. Using" (9) we find: 
Using (6). (9)-(l2). we can write (4) as 
{l-cO)-a 
qi = 
2 + a- [l + 2 C 1 1 2 -- - 2-c -{l-t)-u t 1 a 
(9) 
(lO) 
(II) 
(l2) 
(l3) 
-20-
In a Bayesian-Nash (rational expectations) equilibrium, the 
expected response (9) and the actual response (13) must 
coincide. This implies: . 
1 - c 0- (14) Co = 2 
a- [1_+ 2 + 
c 1 2-c ]-(1-t)-02 t 1 - a 
(1 - c 1 )-t 
c 1 = 2 (15) 
2 + a- [1 + 
c 1 
- 2 ~ c ]- ( 1- t) _ ~2 t 1 a 
Lemma 1. For CO>O, C1>O, there exists an unique pair c O,c 1 
~olving (14) and (15). Further 
Proof: 
Rewrite (14) and (15) as: 
t + (l-t)-c 1 
(16) 
This implies that cO~c1 with equal~ty for t=l. Further, for any 
c 1 ' there exists an unique cO. 
To find c 1 , use (15) to define: 
(17) 
This is a third-order polynomial having at most three roots. We 
can put restrictions on c 1 . Firstly it must be non-negative. 
-21-
Otherwise from (9) an increase in expected demand leads to a 
reduction in output. The first term in (17) is non-negative 
because t~l. Hence the last two terms must be non-positive 
implying: 
t 
2+t 
As Co is increasing in c 1 this also implies 
which gives us the second part of the lemma, and puts bound on 
the possible values of c 1 . To show the first part, we note that 
Thus 
must 
range 
fee) = t < 0 
fee} > 0 
for 
show 
of 
8f 
8c 1 
some 0 ~ 
that f( 
c 1 · From 
c 1 ~ 
} is 
(17): 
for c 1 = 0 
t f( 2t , 
t 
= 2+t 
) = 
monotone in 
F 0 / / t we have 8f > 0 or ~ c 1 ~ ---2 ~.+t uC 1 
O. To show uniqueness, we 
c 1 over the permissible 
, 
Hence there exists ~n unique equilibrium v~lue of c 1 lying 
t between 0 and 2+t. Further, from.(16) there exists a unique cO. 
This completes the proof. 
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Thus we have proven the existence of an equilibrium in our 
model. Further, using (14) and (15) and implicit function' 
theorem, we can show that 
dC l (It ~O (18) 
Recall that t is a measure of the quality of the private 
information. Thus (16) implies that equilibrium firm output as 
given by (9) is increasing in the precision of th~ pri~ate 
information. Conversely, one can show that 
8cO ~ 0 
8c l ~ 0 (19) aa- 8a 
8cO ~ 0 
8c 1 ~ 0 (20) 
802 802 
a a 
Thus the more risk-averse, or the higher the variance, the 
lower is equilibrium output. 
The result in (16) suggests that profits may be decreasing in t 
because we have two counterbalancing effects. Better 
information increases output which depresses profits. but it 
also decrease the viriance of profits which increases the 
expected utility of profits. The effect of a change in the 
degree of risk-aversion would tend to be opposite of the 
effects from a change in't because an increase in a leads to a 
fall in output and hence an increase in expected profits. On 
the other hand, firms become increasingly worried about the 
2 
variance of profits. The effects from a change in 0 are harder 
a 
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to assess as these also leads to changes in t which again 
affects Co and c 1 ' Hence we can not get clear comparative 
static results on the effect on expected utility of profits 
2 from changes in t, a and a . 
a 
Although we cannot get explicit expressions for Co and c 1 ' we 
can, use (9) to write expected utility of profits as: 
aUa c 1 2 2 . 2 2 -2 2 [[ 
- ---- ---(S-c -c +4-c -2-c c +e -2-C)+C -2-c -c ]-a 2 t 0 1 0 0' 1 1 0 0 0 1 
2 
c1 [2 ] 
--- c -6-c +1 tIl (21) 
Before turning to information transmission. we consider three 
special cases of (21): t=O. t=1 and a=O. 
If the information received is usel~ss.· i.e. U ~ ~ and t=O. 
E. 
1 
-------=2 and c 1 = O. The expected 3 + a-a 
then from (14) and (15). Co = 
a 
utility of profits is: 
(22) 
If the information received is perfect. then t=l and c O=c 1=&. 
and we get: 
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(22) and (23) are interesting when one recalls the debate in 
the literature on price variation in a competitive model. An 
early result by Oi(1961) showed that firms preferred greater 
variance 'in price if the realisation of the price was known 
prior to their output choice. This corresponds to the first 
case above. equation (22). Later Sandmo(1971) and Ishii(1977) 
showed that if the realisation was known only after outpu~ was 
choosen. corresponding to equation (23). firms preferred less 
variation in the price. Here we get less cl~ar results. From 
(20). we see that if a is large (a~2 sufficient) we get the 
same result as Oi(1961). The results on (23) are ambiguous. 
Thus with few firms acting strategically. we cannot reproduce 
the results from the competitive literature. 
The final special case. which will be used in section 3 as a 
bench-mark. is risk neutrality. a=O. From (14) and (15) we get 
and t c 1 = 2+t. Profits become: 
(24) 
This is the case considered in the literature sofar. 
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3. Information sharing. 
We consider two sharing systems. In both cases we assume that 
the information is transmitted via a third party, an auditor 
who can determine whether or not the information is true. This 
ensures truth-telling and allows us to disregard problems of 
strategic misinformation. As we consider only one-shot (or 
atemporal) games, the model is not suitable for analysing cases 
where firms deliberately misinform. It is easy to see that in a. 
one-shot game where truth-telling is not required, both will 
claim that demand is low. When demand is actually low, both 
want to avoid over-production. When demand is high, both want 
the other to leave it a larger share of the market. 
It is worth mentioning that such third parties actually exists. 
Trade associations can collect data from firms and. to the 
extend that the realisation can be observed ex post, punish any 
firm found lying (e.g. by banishing the firm from the-
association). Another institution is statistical offices. These 
offices sometimes relies on firms reports in order to produce 
their statistics faster than could be done by using infbrmation 
from e.g. the excise office. Firms are sometimes given an 
incentive to report their date by being given a sneakpreviev 
of the data (compare with the second case below). Given that 
the problem is verification, it is further concievable.that an 
actual independent auditpr is used. The basic point is that if 
firms have an incentiv to sh.re if they dQ so truthfully, then 
if costless or cheap mechanisms exists that ensure this, these 
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will be set up. 
In the first case analysed, firms only get access to the 
information of the other firm if it itself submits its 
information. Hence the two situations to compare is "no 
sharing" with "both sharing". In the second case, a firm get 
the information recieved by the auditor regardless of whether 
it has submitted any information. In this case we consider the 
model as a two stage game, where firms in the first stage 
decides whether or not to submit its information to the 
auditor. Under risk neutrality, no information transmission 
takes place in either case. If firms are risk averse we shall 
see below that this is no longer generally true. 
3.1 Both share information. 
If firms share their information, their information set become 
i=1,2 
We can construct a composite signal S summarising the 
information of the two signals as follows: 
S = a + 
VAR(S) 
1 
-.~ 2 1 
1 
+ -.~ 2 2 
212 
= u + -·u a 2 ~ 
The general formulas are given in appendix II.A. When both 
share the information, t is redefined as 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
t = 
2-t 
l+t > t 
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(28) 
As above we can calculate the expected utility of profits. The 
difference from (23) is not only that t is redefined. but more 
importantly that the output of. the two firms are closer 
correlated. 
'" '" -2 '" [ 2 "') 2 c -(1-2-c )-a + c - 1 - --c -0 o 0 1 ~ 1 a 
'" 
"'3 2-t 4-c 1 --",-t 
'" '" where Co and c 1 are evaluated at eqUilibrium. 
(29) 
Let us first look at the special case of risk-neutrality; a=O: 
"'. 
= 1/3 t c 1 = --", 2+t 
Using {28} we find comparing {24} and {30}: 
So even if they both share their information. information 
sharing is sub-optimal under risk-neutrality. 
(30) 
{31} 
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For a > 0, we no longer have an unambiguous result, so we turn 
to some numerical examples. We are looking for combinations of 
t, a, a and a! such that information sharing is preferred by 
the two firms. 
Generally we would like to have risk sharing preferred for as 
small an a as possible because the smaller is a the closer we 
are to the case of risk neutrality. Interest then centres on a 
and a 2 . Given the assumed normal distribution, we can place 
a 
some restrictions on these, loosely speaking the latter must be 
small relative to the former to avoid negative realisations of 
demand. In order to make the probability of observing a 
negative realisation of the demand intercept small, we choose a 
2 large relative to a . Now: 
a 
Prob{a<O} < .05 
Prob{a<O} < .01 
Prob{a<O} < .001 
-2 . 
a 
"2 > 2.27 
aa 
-2 
a 
"2 > 5.43 
a 
a 
-2 
a 
"2 > 9.55 
aa 
For expositional purposes, choose a = A/a2 , where A is some 
. a 
Positive constant. This implies that a-a2 becomes constant. 
a 
. . 2 
Then, given A (=a-aa) and t, we can find Co and c 1 and. express 
-2 2 
expected utility of profits as a linear function of a and a . 
a 
Also, letting P and S denotes private information and sharing 
respectively, we can write expected utility of profits given by 
either (21) or· (29) as: 
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E(U(I1~}} (32) 
E(U(I1~» (33) 
where fi and Ci • i=s.p are constants. Using equation (32) and 
-2 2 (33) we can find the combination of a and a for which firm i 
a 
-2 2 is indifferent between sharing and not sharing. a = A-a • 
a 
-2 2 
where A is given by A = (C -C )/(f -f ). Thus any a 10 < A p ssp a 
implies that firm i have an incentive to share its information 
with firm j. 
Below in table 1 we have worked through some numerical 
examples. with A given if relevant. 
Table 1. Profits of firm i when both share information. 
2 t f C A ao case a 
0.00 0.5 P 1/9 .08 
S 1/9 .0625 -
0.01 0.1 P .11091 .02593 
S .11089 .00707 
0.5 P .11086 .07994 
S .11085 .06257 
0.9 P .11086 .10698 
S .11086 .10328 1650.00 
0.10 0.1 P .10903 .02187 
S .10891 .00808 
0.5 P .10856 .07940 
S .10853 .06320 
0.9 P .10858 .10661 
S .10861 .10296 155.00 
1.00 0.1 P , .09081 .01639 
- S .08963 .01282 
0.5 P .08391 .07272 
S .08413 .06708 25.82 
\ 0.9 P .08519 .10269 
S .08576 .09960 5.42 
0.01 1.0 P .11086 .11105 
S .11086 .11105 
-
I 
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2 -From table 1 note that if t=0.9, a=0.01, a =1 and a ) 41 
a 
information sharing is preferred. Thus it is possible to 
reverse the result obtained under risk-neutrality even with a 
low absolute degree of risk aversion provided that a is 
2 
sufficiently greater than a . Note further that the higher is 
a 
a, the more readily do we get information sharing. 
To confirm the idea that for t and a large, the critical value 
A is small and information transmission likely, we have shown A 
as a function of t in figur 1. 
a>a' 
+---------~------L-t>i'ra<O] < 0.001 
+-----------------"',-pr[a<O] < 0.01 
, 
~
1 t 
Figure 1. 
Thus in the case where firms are very risk-averse, they are 
willing to share information, supporting the initial intuition. 
Further if the private information is fairly precise firms have 
an incentive to share information. This latter point should be 
inteipreted with some care, as much of the value from sharing 
.. 
When t is high comes from the assumption that the private 
information is uncorrelated. 
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3.2 Unilateral sharing. 
In this case a firm recieve the pooled information from the 
auditor indepenent of whether or not it has itself transmitted 
any information. We then have to consider the incentives to 
unilaterally transmit their information. Assume that only firm 
i transmit its information. The information sets then become: 
The problem becomes less tractable because we have to look at 
asymmetric solutions to (14) and (15). Given that a solution 
exists we can write down expected utility of profits of the 
firm transmitting its information unilaterally as: 
1 2 [ [2 2 1 221 
- --a-a - c -c -- + (1-2-c -c ) -c -- + 
, 2 a Oi 1j tj Oi OJ 1i ti 
- 3 2-t i 2 2 
- c -2--- - c -c --- + 1i ti 1i 1j ti (.34) 
-32-
where c Oi ' c Oj ' c li and c lj are evaluated at equilibrium. 
Let us first consider risk-neutrality . 
1 -2 
= g·a 
• { 2 ti 2/t j } 2 
+ -·0 
{4-t t}2 a 
i j 
{35} 
Now ti=t and t j =2t/{1+t}. Comparing (35) with (24) we see that 
sharing is not profitable for firm i, hence in combination with 
{29} we have the well known result that under risk-neutrality, 
is a dominating strategy not to share information. 
Turning to a > 0, we work through the same numerical examples 
as presented in table 1. The results are presented in table 2 
below: 
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Table 2. Profits of the transmitting firm from 
unilatteral information sharing. 
2 t case f r A aa a 
0.00 0.5 P 1/9 .08 
S 1/9 .0625 -
0.01 0.1 P .11091 .02593 
S .11090 .02078 
0.5 P .11086 .07994 
S .11087 .06607 2021.96 
0.9 P .11086 .10698 
S .11086 .10 61 2301.79 
0.10 0.1 P .10903 .02187 
S .10909 .02019 29.04 
0.5 P .10856 .07940 
S .10876 .06563 72.20 
0.9 P .10858 .10661 
S .10865 .10019 99.66 
1.00 0.1 P .09081 .01639 
S .09456 .01555 0.22 
0.5 P .08391 .07272 
S .09474 .06070 1. 11 
0.9 P .08519 .10269 
s .08901 .09463 2.12 
0.01 1.0 P .11086 .11105 
S .110S6 .11105 -
We see that even if a is very small. we can find combinations 
of a and a2 such that unilatteral information sharing is 
a 
preferred by the transmitting firm. Further the critical value 
of A,to the transmitting firm seems to be increasing in a for 
fixed a: and t. and decreasing in t. Note that the picture here 
is reversed in the case of varying t. This is naturally caused 
by the fact that if you are the only firm transmitting. then 
, 
the concequence is .small when your information is imprecise. 
You are not giving so much away. 
We then consider the incentives for firm j to submit its 
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information once it has recieved the information of firm i. The 
numerical examples are presented in table 3 below, where the 
case 1S denotes only firm i sharing and 2S denotes both 
sharing. 
Table 3. Profits of the recieving firm. 
2 t f r A aa case a 
0.00 0.5 1S 1/9 .08 
2S 1/9 .06612 -
0.01 O. 1 1S .110893 .04127 
2S .110892 .00707 
0.5 1S .110845 .11153 
2S .110855 .06257 5264.34 
0.9 1S .110858 .11569 
2S .110862 .10328 3877.25 
0.10 0.1 1S .10902 .04013 
2S .10891 .00808 
0.5 1S .10853 .11115 
2S .10853 .06320 
0.9 1S . 10859 .11540 
2S .10861 .10296 615.83 
1.00 O. 1 1S .09539 .03084 
2S .08963 .01282 
0.5 1S .09245 .10519 
2S .08413 .06704 
0.9 1S .08669 .11247 
2S .08576 .09960 
0.01 1.0 1S .11086 .11105 
2S .11086 .11105 -
Here we see that in all but a.few cases (e.g. a=0.1, t=0.9, 
a!=1 and a=26) firm j would not prefer to submit its 
information once it has got the information of firm i. Thus 
transmission is only in some, possibly few, cases a dominant 
strategy if a firm can get the information of the other firm 
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without having to submit its own information (but such cases do 
exist. e.g. t=.9 and A=.Ol). This implies a potential need for 
a coordination devise because of the cases where both firms 
would benefit from sharing if only they could commit to both 
submitting the information. The coordination could be supplied 
by the auditor by simply requiring that a firm to obtain some 
information must supply its own. 
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4. Concluding remarks 
Two things have been shown in this paper. Firstly. we found 
that the output level of risk averse Cournot duopolists was 
increasing in the quality of their private information and 
decreasing in their perception of risk. The effect on profits 
was less clear. but from the numerical results in table 1 - 3. 
it seems that expected utility of profits are decreasing in the 
degree of absolute risk aversion. 
Secondly. we have shown that once one allows for risk-aversion. 
it is no longer generally true that duopolists do not want to 
share information. This was shown using numerical examples. and 
is yet another example of the non-robustness of results derived 
in models analysing the effect of private information. 
We also found cases where firms had an incentive to share their 
information. but where this would require that they could only 
obtain the shared information if they submitted their own. As 
argued above. this need not be restrictive and can tentatively 
be used to explain some institutional arrangements. as well as 
the practise of some institutions .. 
Besides having to resort to numerical examples. the paper makes 
a number of heroic assumptions regarding both the specification 
of the utility function anq the distributions of the stochastic 
variables. Firstly. the aim was to provide examples where the 
results in the.litterature did not hold. To this end. examples 
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are sufficient. Secondly. we did not need the utility functions 
to be very' concave to get the result. so we would expect the 
results to hold for other functions as well. Thirdly. we could 
have used other distributions. The important thing is the 
linear update rule (6). As shown in Ericson(1969}. see also 
Li(19S6}. this rule also holds with other distributions which 
do not suffer from the problem of having positive probabilities 
of negative realisations. 
Finally. the model analysed have been an atemporal Cournot 
oligopoly model. we should like to point out a problem with 
these models when private information is introduced. If we 
consider a dynamic model with learning as e.g. Kirman{19S3}. 
where firms in a duopoly over time learn about their residual 
demand. then although firms' estimates of the parameters may 
converge. strong assumptions are needed to insure that they 
converge to the actual parameters of the residual demand. Thus 
even in a rational expectations model. the outcome may differ 
from the Cournot outcome because the estimates are biased. This 
implies that the assumption of unbiased estimates of the random 
parameter (i.e. (5» is far stronger than commonly thought. as 
in ensures that the expected output will be the Cournot output. 
It would therefore be interesting to consider models where 
firms have to learn the parameters from past observations on 
price and their own output level. a task left for future 
research. 
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Footnotes: 
I} .The linearity of the conditional expectation E(aIS i } 
does not hinge specifically on the normality assumption. It 
would be equally true if f.i. the prior was gamma and the 
signal poisson. or if the prior was beta and the signal 
binomial. see Ericson(1969}. . 
2} Any non-linearity would arise because firms thought that 
someone thought that some-one reacted non-linearily. Thus 
one could concievably get self-fulfilling equilibria which 
are not affine. but it would require an unconvincing story. 
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Appendix II.A 
In general if 8 1 ,82 are bivariat normal with variance-
covariance matrix 
then we can construct a composite signal 8 summarising the 
information of the two signals as follows: 
where 
I) = 
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CHAPTER III 
Stackelberg Leading Cartel and 
Differential Information. 
-41-
1. Introduction. 
The question which concerns us is to what extend firms have an 
incentive to share private information. A number of papers. 
Clarke(1983a.b). Gal-Or(1985a.1986) , Novshek and 
Sonnenshein(1982). Li(1985). Sakai(1985). Shapiro(1985) and 
Vives(1984) have considered Cournot or Bertrand models where 
firms were allowed to pool information. The general conclusion 
to emerge is that in equilib~ium. firms have no incentives to 
share information. In these models. firms are not allowed to 
collude over strategies, only information. Clarke(1983b) points 
out that if firms are allowed to collude over strategies the 
result would be reversed. Our aim is to set up a simple model 
in which firms choose whether or not to share information and 
collude over the choice of strategies. 
To this end, we consider a model of endogenous cartel 
formation. where the cartel is assumed to pool the information 
of the members. We use the Stackelberg solution concept with 
the cartel acting as the Stackelberg leader. The non-cartel 
members act as Cournot followers. taking the output chosen by 
the cartel and the other followers as given~) In the case 
considered here. this solution concept is equivalent to the one 
suggested in Selten(1913). To obtain a benchmark with which to 
evaluate the impact of imperfect information and information 
sharing the model is solve~ under certainty. This is compared 
to the solutions under different information structures to see 
whether different information structures ceteris paribus gives 
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rise to larger or smaller cartels. i.e. whether there is a gain 
from sharing information. 
We consider a model of differential information. No firm 
believes that any other individual firm has access to better 
information. Each firm observes a private signal on a random 
variable. essential for their choice of strategy. In accordance 
with the literature. this is assumed to be the intercept of a 
common inverse demand function. ~ ca~tel bases its choice of 
output on its signal. and the expected response of the 
followers. A follower base its choice of output on its private 
signal. the other followers' expected response to their signal. 
and the output of the cartel. which given the sequential nature 
of the game is known to them with certainty. In general we 
assume the following timing of events. Prior to observing their 
signal. firms choose whether or not to belong to a cartel 
acting as specified above. When the cartel is formed. firms 
recieve their signal and the cartel chooses its strategy. At 
this stage it is assumed that no firm will be allowed to leave 
or join the cartel. Following the disclosure of the strategy of 
the cartel. the followers choose their strategy non-
cooperatively and without communication. 
We assume that the n firms .in the industry are identical in all 
important respects. having access to the same technology. 
producing a homogeneous good. and observing a signal with a 
Common mean and variance. The question is firstly whether a 
stable cartel exists in such a model. Secondly. what is the 
* maXimum number of firms n for which it is true that all firms 
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are in the cartel? We shall call this the critical number of 
firms. This number is of interest because all firms are 
identical. If only a subset of all firms are in the cartel, the 
firms outside have higher expected profits than does the cartel 
members. Although such a cartel can be stable, no process apart 
from side payment will ensure the establishment of the cartel, 
because otherwise identical firms would be treated differently. 
* Hence a stable cartel would only emerge for n ~ n . For the 
purpose of assessing the effect of in(orm~tion sharing within 
* the cartel, the interest centres around the effect on n . If 
* differential information leads to a higher n , we will say that 
information sharing contributes to collusion. If on the other 
* hand it leads to a lower n , then information sharing hampers 
collusion. 
In section 2 the model is solved under certainty, It is shown 
that a unique stable cartel exists and can be characterised 
fully. As noted above, the Stackelberg solution concept is in 
this case formally identical to the solution concept proposed 
in Selten(1973). This solution concept is described in section 
2, where the equivalence is further elaborated. 
In section 3, a model with differential information in which 
each firm is assumed to observe a private signal on a random 
variable is solved. It is assumed that firms act as if they 
only had access to their own information, i.e~ there is no 
learning. 
In section 4 the fact that the strategy of the cartel found in 
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section 3 reveals all its information to the followers is used. 
This implies that the followers become the better informed. and 
not surpricingly this gives a disencentive to cartel formation. 
In section 5 we sketch a model in which it is not possible for 
the followers to learn all the information of the leader. We 
establish necessary conditions for how little of the cartel 
information the followers are allowed to learn in order that 
information transmission on its own lead to a larger cartel 
(i.e. a larger cartel). 
Section 6 considers some related papers. Sakai(1984) on 
Stackelberg games. Clarke(1982) and Shapiro(1985) on Cournot 
games with collusion. 
Section 7 concludes the paper and points at directions for 
further research. 
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2. Certainty. 
Assume that the industry contains n firms, initially in a 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Entry is not allowed, thus n is 
fixed. Let demand be linear with the slope normalised to -1. 
P = a - Q ( 1 ) 
where P is the price and qi output level of firm i. Let 
marginal costs be constant, for simplicity set equal to zero, 
implying that price is interpreted as net of marginal costs. 
We assume that firms choose whether or not to belong to a 
cartel prior to choosing their output level. The cartel 
maximises joint profits and firms get an equal share of this 
profit. The cartel choose its strategy (output level) proir to 
the firms outside the cartel. This can be described as a three-
stage game version of d'Aspremont et al(1983}. In stage I, 
firms simultaneously choose whether or not to belong to the 
cartel. The number of cartel members is made known to all. In 
stage 2 the cartel choose its output level. This is made known 
to the other firms. In stage 3 the followers, that is firms not 
in the cartel, choose their output level simultaneously. The 
last two stages are simply the Stackelberg leader-follower 
oligopoly model where the followers are individual Cournot 
firms. 
'.1 II 
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Looking for a subgame perfect equilibrium we first solve the 
Stackelberg sub-game for'a given number of cartel members k. 
If k=O we get the n-firm Cournot model. the solution to which 
is: 
q(O) a = n+T 
P(O) a = n+l 
ncO) = [n:l]2 
Let superscript f and c denote follower and cartel firm 
respectively and let Ui(k). i=f.c denote firm profit of a 
follower and cartel member respectively if the cartel has k 
(2) 
members. The resulting equilibrium depends on k. the number of 
cartel members. 
qC(k) a 1 ~ k ~ n = 2-k 
qf(k) a 1 ~ k ~ n-l = 2-(n-k+l) 
P(k) a 1 ~ k ~ n = 2-(n-k+l) 
2 
UC(k) a 1 ~ k ~ n (3) = 4-k- (n-k+l) 
nf(k) 
2 
a 1 ~ k ~ n-l (4) = . 2 
.. 4-(n-k+l) 
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Note that the total cartel output QC is always equal to a/2. 
the mon~poly output level. independent of k and n. This is only 
true for this special case where marginal costs are identical. 
It arises because the resudial demand of the cartel. given the 
1 c 
optimal reaction of the fringe (given by P n-k+1·(a-Q ) ) is an 
anti-clockwise rotation of the demand curve around P(Q)=O. 
Hence the first order condition of the cartel is independent of 
nand k. 
* An equilibrium in the first stage is a k such that firm i is 
indifferent between changing its position. Thus if firm i 
belong to the cartel: 
(5) 
If firm i is a follower: 
(6) 
* Then k is an equilibrium if (5) and (6) holds for all i. 
By ·inspection aiT
f 
0 auf auc auc k ~ n+1 ak > • ak > ak ak ~ 0 for ~ 2 
where we for simplicity treat Ui(k) (i=c.f) as continuous 
functions of k. Comparing (2) and (3) .we see that UC (l) > -U(O). 
Further nf(k) ~ nC(k) for k ~ 
2 
a 
4n 
n+1 Finally: 
-r . 
From this follows that a k* exists. For k < n+1 
-r' (6) is 
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n+l f c 
violated. At k = ~ we have IT (k) = IT (k) and (5) holds. If 
(6) holds. 'we have an equilibrium. Otherwise we know that (5) 
must hold for k+l and we can preceed in an iterative manner 
until (6) holds or k=n is reached. 
In the present case we can find an analytical expression for 
M' k . Using (3) and (4) we can write (5) and (6) as: 
(5' ) 
3en+l+j n2 -2 en-1 
4 (6' ) 
For n>4 a stable cartel k is given by 
3en+5-j n 2 -2 en-1 
4 (1) 
The distance between the upper and lower bound is equal to one. 
A stable cartel exists and is unique. because as is shown in 
appendix III.A. the lower bound in (1) cannot be an integer. 
The equilibrium can be characterised as follows: 2 ) 
if n ~ 4 
if n > 4 
(S) 
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. ~. (~)2 if n ~ 4 
l1c{k*) = (9) [a)2 1 if n > 4 2 . (n+l_<n+3>]<n+3> 
. 2 2 
if n ~ 4 
l1f{k*) _ (lO) 
[a)2 1 2 · [n+l_<n;3>]2 if n > 4 
It is worth noting that we are able to find an explicit 
analytical solution to the model analytically. This is rarely 
the case. In the model assuming competitive followers, e.g. 
d'Aspremont et al{l983) and Donsimoni{l985) this is not 
possible. This gives us a benchmark with which to compare the 
case with differential information. 
The second thing to note is that n=4 is the highest number of 
firms for whi9h it is true that all firms will be in the 
cartel. For n>4 we know from above that rrf{k*) > l1c{k*). As 
firms are initially identical, it is not obvious how such an 
* equilibrium could be reached. This makes n =4 the interesting 
benchmark. 
2.1 An equivalent solution concept. 
Selten(1913) considers the following three stage game model of 
the endogen~us-formation of a cartel. In stage I, firms decide 
whether or not to partiCipate in cartel negotiations possibly 
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leading to the formation of a cartel. The decision is taken 
simultaneously and the outcome is made known to all the firms. 
It is assumed that firms can enter binding quota agreements 
setting an upper bound to their output level. In stage 2. firms 
having chosen to participate in the negotiations simultaneously 
submit a proposed set of quotas for each af the participants. 
If a- set of firms agree on a set of quotas. these firms will 
constitute a cartel. The outcome of this stage is made known to 
all firms prior to stage 3. in which firms playa Cournot game 
subject to the constraints imposed by the quotas. 
For the quotas to make sense they must be exactly binding in 
equilibria. Thus it is as if the cartel has the first mover 
advantage of a Stackelberg leader. and the cartel will choose a 
set of quotas identical to the choice of cartel output level 
chosen by a Stackelberg leading cartel. Thus stage 2 and 3 are 
equivalent-to the two stages in the Stackelberg leader-follower 
game. 
Selten use the' concept of perfect equilibrium in this paper 
implying that the equilibrium must be subgame perfect. As the 
model is then solved backwards the choice implied in stage 1 
corresponds-to requirement (5) and (6) above. 
The model used in section 2 above is simpler to apply than the 
Selten(1913} model which gets very complicated once one allows 
for more general cost or demand structures. The equivalence 
SUpports the ncition that the Stackelberg solution concept is a 
Possible approximation to models with endogenous cartel 
'H 
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formation. The most problematic assumption in Selten(1973} is 
the assumption of binding quota agreements. corresponding to 
the assumption in the Stackelberg model that the leader has 
exogeneously been allotted the first mover advantage. What the 
Selten(1973} model helps to bring out clearly is the 
possibility that cartel negotiations can lead to precommitment 
of the members. 
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3. Cartel equilibrium under differential information. 
Assume that the demand intercept a is random. The inverse 
demand function is given by: 
n 
P = a - 2 qi 
i=l 
- 2 a ~ N{a,a ) 
a 
Before making their.str~tegy decision, each firm observe a 
private signal Si' given by: 
(11) 
(12) 
As both S1 and a are assumed normal, the expected value of a 
given S1 is given by:3) 
where 
2 
a 
a 
As in section 2 we first solve the n-firm oligopoly model. 
Firms are assumed risk neutral, maximising expected profits 
given their information. The problem of a typical firm is: 
(13) 
(14) 
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m~~ E(a- l qj - qi)-qiISi) 
j;J!i 
qi-l E(qjISi) - q~) 
, j;J!i 
To solve this a firm must make some conjecture of how other 
firms react to their signal. The linearity of (11) and (13) 
makes the guess of a linear response function reasonable 
(15) 
(16) 
As the firms are assumed identical, the coefficients hOi and 
h1i are identical for all i. Hence 
= (n-1)-(hO+h 1 )a + h 1 - l E(SjISi) 
j;J!i 
Using the rational expectaiions equilibrium concept, these 
. beliefs must be correct in equilibrium. Thus (16) and the first 
order condition from (15) must be identical. From this we find 
hO and h1' and substitute these back into the first order 
condition. The 'solution to the model is: 
a + t -(S - a) 
n+1 2+(n-1)-t. i i =1, • • • ,n (17) 
E(U(O» 
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t e «2-t)-(I-t)e n )ea2 
2 a (2+(n-l)et) 
(18) 
As in section 2. let k firms form a cartel. These firms are now 
able to collude over strategy choices and to pool their private 
information. The pooled signal can be written as: 
(19) 
where K is the set of cartel members. and k the number of 
members. As k is known. Sc contains the same information as Si 
and is hence a sufficient statistic for Si. Thus the cartel 
observes a signal with a smaller variance than the individual 
follower. 
With the cartel acting as a Stackelberg leader. each follower 
receives two signals. its private signal Si and a public signal 
c· Q - - the strategy choice of the cartel. First we assume that 
the followers do not attempt to extract information from the 
output choice of the cartel. The typical follower solves: 
ma~ E(Ca - QC - ~ qj -qi)eqiI S i ] 
j€N'K 
j~i 
whe~e a and qj are random. Firm i's conjecture about how other 
follower firms Teact to their signal given in (16) is 
reformulated to include QC. 
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qg h -a + h -(S -a) + h _Qc j = 0 1 j 2 (20) 
Proceeding as above. we find the profit maximising output level 
c 
of a typical follower conditional on Q as: 
1 -a + t (-) 1 c qi = n-k+1 2+(n-k-1}-~- Si-a - n-k+1- Q 
The problem of the cartel is 
m~~ E[{a - QC - l qj)-QcI Sc ] 
jEN,\K 
The solution of the model is 
a 
= 2-k + 
s. t. (21) 
{2-t)-t
c 
_ 
-""'2---'1'-";;'- (S c -a) 
(21) 
(22) 
P(k) = a -
{2-t)-tc _ 2-(n-k)+1_-
a 
t \ 
2-{n-k+1} - ~- L (Si-a ) - 2-'1' -(Sc-a) 
where 'I' = 2 + (n-k-1)-t . 
c 
iEN'\K 
The relevant profit expression to consider when establishing 
the existence of a stable cartel is the unconditional expected 
profit of the two types of firms. This gives: 
-2 
= a + 4{n-k+1}k 
(2-t)t (n-k+1) 
c -2kcp E[(Sc-a)-a] (23) 
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E(llf(k» = 
-2 
a 
2 4(n-k+l) 
t
2 
- 2 
--E[(S -a) ] 2 i 
.p 
(2-t)tt _ _ (2-t)tt ( '\ ] 
- c-E[(S -aleS -a)] + . 2 c· E (Sc-~) L (Sj-~) 
2.n2 i c 2 T .p j€N\K 
+ (24) 
-2 -2 -Using E(Si-a ) } = VAR(Si); E«Sc-a ) ) = VAR(Sc); E((Si-a}a) = 
E((Sc-~)a) = v! and tc-VAR(Sc} = v! we can write (23) and (24) 
as: 
-2 2 (2-t) t (n-k+l) 2 E(llc (k» a + c = 4(n-k+l)k 4k.p2 
-0 a (25) 
E(rr f (k» 
-2 4t - (2-t)(2+t)t 2 a + c = 2 2 -v 4(n-k+l) 4-.p a 
(26) 
Note that the first term in both (25) and (26) corresponds to 
cartel and fringe profits under certainty. compare with 
equation (3) and (4). As O~t~l and O~t ~1. the second term in 
c 
n-k+l 2 (25) is bounded from above by 4-k -va. Similarly the second 
1 2 term in (26) is bounded from above by n-k+l·va. From this 
follows that if v 2 is not too large relative to ~ then a stable 
a 
cartel exists. 
From (22) we see that the followers are able to infer the 
information of-the cartel from QC. We turn to this in the next 
section. 
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4. Full information transmission from cartel to fringe. 
Aisume that the firms initially only observe one signal given 
by (12). In the present set up the cartel has no chance of 
obtaining any further information. As the fringe firms choose 
their strategies after the cartel. they could potentially 
obtain information from the leaders strategy choice. Assume 
that the follower only uses their own private information. 
Their gain from obtaining more inform~tion is: 
aE(Uf(k}} = 
at (27) 
Thus the fringe firms have an incentive to attempt to learn the 
information of the cartel. Turning to the cartel. 
= -
(2-t)t
c
(n-k)(n-k-1) 2 
3 eOa < 0 
." 
(28) 
The leader prefers the signal of the followers to be noisy 
rather than perfect. and would. if possible. like to prevent 
the follower from learning from·its action. 4 ) 
If the cartel does not recognise its ability to affect what the 
followers infer from the output choice of the cartel. then in 
the presen~. set up there is nothing which prevents the follower 
from learning all the information of the leader. From the 
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output choice of the cartel. equation (22) we see that given a 
follower has sufficient information to compute its functional 
form. the choice of cartel output is an invertible function of 
S and would fully reveal the information of the leader to the 
c-
follower. The follower thus knows S and uses this to update 
c 
his signal. 5 ) Asssume that the leader does not attempt to bias 
its output. Then both Si and Sc are unbiased and the only 
f 
effect is on the variance. Denote the updated signal Sit 
E(S!) = E(a) = a and 212 = a + --·a a k+1 ~ 
Denoting by t f the precision of the signal of the follower. 
this can be written as: 
(k+l)a2 
a 
(29) 
(30) 
f Using (29) to substitute Si for Si and (30) to substitute tf(k) 
for t in the equilibrium profit functions (23) and (24) and 
simplify using E[(s!-a)(sjf-a )] = a! . [k2 + 2k + 1]. profits 
(k+1)2 tc 
become :. 
-2 
-a 
.... 4(n-k+1)k 
E(Uf(k}} = 
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(n-k-I}t f 
2(k+l} 24p2 e 
As argued above. the interest centres around the largest number 
of firms for which it is true that k=n is a stable cartel. 
Recalling that both t f and tcare functions of k. we compute: 
c) f E(U (n ) - E(U (n-I}) 4-n -2 = 16n·a. + 
(n-I) 2 2 4-n -2 t2(n}e 
(4-n}nO' +40' 
a c 
= 
__ea + 2 2 2 16n c 16n (n-l}O' +0' 
a c 
4-n -2 2 
= 
__ea + f eO' (33) 16n I a 
The expression in (33) is certainly non-negative for n~4 and 
may be positive for n>4. Even if the followers learn all the 
* information of the cartel. there is a bias towards a larger n . 
One could question the use of the case of perfect information. 
i.e. the results in section 2. as the relevant benchmark 
because uncertainty-on its own might be enough to lead to a 
larger cartel. An alternative benchmark is the case where all 
firms shar~d all the available information. Putting T = 
in (25) and (26) we get: 
t = t c 
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2 4-n -2 + T{4-nT >.02 
= 16n ea 16n a 
(34) 
2 
no 
Now T a = 2 2' 
no +0 
a ~ 
Compairing fl and f2 we find that for f 2 >0. 
f2 > fl if: 
which is true for f 2 >0. Also f 2=0 ~ f 1<0. Hence the existence 
of differential information is on its own sufficient to bias 
* the results towards a higher n • and the bias is larger than in 
the case where the followers learn. This indicates that when 
the followers can learn all the information of the cartel. 
making them the better informed agents, private information 
produce a disincentive to cartel formation. 
The assumption that the cartel does not take into consideration 
that its output choice affects the information of the follower 
is made for tractability. It is a strong assumption which may 
seem to lead to a too small cartel by placing it at a 
disadvantage. This is though not necessarily the case. 
Gal-Or(1987) has analysed a model with one Stack~lberg leader 
and one follower, both having access to some private 
information. The leader has an incentive to under-produce in 
order to signal to the follower that demand is low. The 
follower realise this and attempt to take any induced bias into 
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consideration. Gal-Or shows that a fully revealing equilibrium 
exist. 6 ) Furthermore. the follower has the higher expected 
profits. a result which runs counter to the case of no 
uncertainty where the leader has the higher profit. The result 
arise because the leader is unsuccesful in misleading the 
follower and is thus just left with a lower output level. 
Further the leader has to choose a low output level as any 
higher output level would lead the follower to infer that 
demand was high and hence to expand output. Thus the leader is 
caught in a bad situation where he is made worse off by his 
private information. 
If the results of Gal-Or carries over to our model. then the 
cartel should be even worse off if we allowed it to try and 
influence what the followers infer from its output choice. Thus 
if it was possible to solve the general case we would expect 
the result that private information may lead to smaller cartels 
to be strengthened. 
It is worth noting that it is the simplicity of the.present 
model which enables the followers to learn. It would therefore 
be interesting to. consider cases where this is not possible 
{e.g. when costs are random). To this we turn in the next 
section. 
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5. Different information structures. 
Assume that the model in section 2 is enlarged to include a 
random constant cost term cieqi = ceqi + n i qi where c is 
subsumed in a. Assume further that each firm i observes a 
2 perfect signal on their own costs ni-N(O,on)' but observe no 
signal on other firms costs, and that the ni's are 
uncorrelated. We then get an extra source of noise in the 
ou tpu t deci s ion of' the c.ar tel. 
The output decision of the cartel depends on the lovest costs 
of any membir n . This firm will produce the total amount of 
c 
cartel output. The problem of profit sharing within the cartel 
is presently ignored. 
The cartel has no prior knowledge on n j , j€N~K other than its 
distribution.' Taking expectations, this nets out when writing 
down the first order condition of the cartel. Rewriting (22) to 
get this: 
!!. + 2 
n-k+l 
2 enc 
from which it is not possible to infer S perfectly by 
, c· 
observing QC(k). 
Rather than solving this model explicitly, we consider a 
(22' ) 
-63-
general case in which the followers are not able to infer all 
of the 'cartel's information. This is done by choosing specific 
values of t and t in (25) and (26). 
c 
Assume that the information of a firm can be summarised in one 
signal. Further assume that this signal is identical for firms 
within the cartel and the group of followers, but that it may 
differ between these two groups. One way of achieving this 
would be by introducing more noise into the system as in the 
example above. 
As we do not specify the extend of information transmission, 
both t f and tc are possibly functions of k. We are only 
concerned with the case where k=n is the stable cartel. For 
simplicity write tc(n), tc(n-l) and tf(n-l) as t
c
' t~ and ti 
respectively. 
4-n -2 
---·a 16n 
• 
tc 2 
+ --·a -4n a 
(35) 
Comparing (35) with (34) for f2>O, we find that f3 > f2 (i.e. 
information sharing implies a larger cartel) implies: 
Thu~ a necessary condition for f3 ~ f2 is that t~ > ti. This 
implies that for information sharing to have a positive effect 
on the size of a stable cartel, the follower must in 
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equilibrium be less well informed than the cartel. 
Finally consider the extreme where t = t = 1. In this case 
c 
(25) and (26) become: 
1 -2 2 -----:~.--=2 • ( a + 0 ) 
4(n-k+l) a 
The analysis in section 2 carries through and (8) gives the 
unique stable cartel. Further: 
= 4-n. (a2 + 0 2 ) 16n a 
Thus in case of uncertainty where this is resolved prior to 
* forming the cartel n = 4 as under certainty. 
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6. Related literature. 
Sakai{1984} consider the role of information in a Stackelberg 
duopoly model. Two papers allow for collusion. Clarke{1982} 
considers uncertain demand and mergers in a model where all 
decision makers act as Cournot players. Shapiro{1985} considers 
trade-associations in a model with uncertain costs. 
Sakai{1984} consider a case with two firms. a follower and a 
leader. corresponding to n=2. k=l. The two firms either observe 
a perfect signal. 0 2 = 0 or a useless signal. 0 2 = m.This 
c c 
gives rise to four possible cases. The model has the same 
demand structure as above. but assumes linear marginal costs. 
As in the first model in section 3. the follower is not allowed 
to learn from the leaders choice of action. We are thus able to 
get the results of Sakai{1984b} as special cases of the model 
in section 3. 
In our model. set n=2. k=l. t € {0.1} and t€ {0.1}. Thus 
c 
t =1. t=l corresponds to the case where both firms observe a 
c 
perfect signal. tc=O. t=O corresponds to the case where neither 
observes a (useful) signal. and t =1. t=O; t =0. t=l 
.. c c 
corresponds to the mixed cases where one of the two .firms is 
informed. the other not. We use the notation in Sakai(1984) 
1 . 
such that Err (i.j) denotes the expected profit of firm I if 
t =i and t=j. and the value pertaining to the carteJ i$ written 
c -
first. Thus Err f {O.l} is the profit of the follower when t =0 
c 
and t f =l. In his theorem 2. Sakai shows that: 
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Thus as in (25) and (26) the leader prefers the follower to be 
ignorant. the follower prefers to be informed. This implies 
that the follower would attempt to obtain extra information. 
and this should be allowed for in the model. 
Further from the model it is easy to show that both firms would 
prefer to be the leader regardless of the information 
structure. This means that we are back to the well known 
problem of how to establish an endogenous leader. a problem 
first pointed out by Stackelberg(1934.1938). 
Cla~ke(1982) extends a model of merger by Salant et al(1983) to 
a stochastic environment where firms observe a noisy signal on 
a random variable. By merging the firms can share their private 
information. The game played is a Cournot-Nash game. Even 
following a merger the firms choose their strategies 
. simultaneously. This avoids any problems to do with learning 
and information transmission because all output levels are 
chosen simultaneously. The use of the Cournot-Nash solution 
concept implies that unless there are scale gains from merger 
via improved costs or information. the sole effect of the 
merge~ is: to reduce the number of strategic players. Not 
surprising this gives rise to difficulties in ~btaining stable 
mergers in the absense of such scale gains. because the benefit 
from the reduction on the number of strategic players is far 
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greater for the non-merging firms. 
With information sharing a scale gain is introduced and this 
does to some extend alleviate the problem. All strategic 
players are identical save the accuracy of their information. 
The merger process leading to an endogenous equilibrium 
coalition structure is modeled as a set of repeated static 
decisions by pairs of firms. Thus there is a series of discrete 
choices whereby th~ number of strategic players is reduced by 
one in each stage until no more mergers take place. Two 
criteria are considered, the "marginal" where the firms only 
consider the total gain from merging allowing one firms loss to 
be offset against the others gain, and the "average" where each 
firms has to gain from the merger. The former allows for 
side-payments, the latter not. The first problem is that the 
procedure together with either of the criteria prevents firms 
from comparing present profit with the profit ensuing from say 
a four firm merger. This may well be profitable even if the 
three mergers necessary to obtain this are not. Secondly, the 
procedure together with the criteria biases the results towards 
too few mergers as does the chosen solution concept. 
Shapiro(1985) considers cost uncertainty and compare two cases 
"no information sharing" and "full information sharing". The 
game evolves in four stages: (1) the firms have the opportunity 
to make agreements regarding the sharing of cost information, 
(2) each firm i observes its own costs, (3) the firms exchange 
information according to any agreements in place from (1), and 
{4} each firm chooses an output level. It is shown that 
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information sharing is the unique dominant strategy both under 
differential information and asymmetric information. Further a 
case where firms may join a trade-association and share its 
information with the other members is considered and it is 
shown that all firms would belong to the association. Members 
of the trade-association only share information. The model 
differs from ours in considering perfect signals and by 
concerning uncertainty about a "private" rather than a "public" 
variable. 
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7. Concluding remarks. 
We have attempted to investigate the effect of private 
information when firms are colluding over strategies. If 
private information gives a higher incentive to collude. we 
have an indication of firms having an incentive to share 
information in equilibrium if they can also collude. To model 
this. the endogenous formation of a cartel which shares 
information and collude over strategies was considered. 
Our main finding was: Differential information is not 
necessarily in itself sufficient to provide incentives for 
cartel formation. Incentives were greater if the non-cartel 
members were unable to learn all the information of the cartel. 
Thus if the cartel cannot avoid disseminating most of its 
information. then private information can have a detrimental 
effect on the size of a collusive arrangement. This indicates 
that the result found in the literature on information sharing 
(e.g. Clarke(1983b» that firms do not share information unless 
they can collude over strategies may not be generally true. It 
will be necessary to model the simultaneous incentives to 
collude and share information explicitly. 
A number of issues have been left aside. First. the timing of 
events could be questioned. Especially two questions are of 
interest. What would happen if firm i decided wheter or not to 
join a cartel after it had recieved its signal? What if a 
firm could leave the cartel after the information was shared 
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but before a strategy was chosen? Regarding the first 
question. the interest centres around who. will be in the 
cartel; those with the most extreme signal. those with the most 
positive (negative) signal. or those with the least extreme 
signal (i.e. closest to a ). In this context firms are 
different ex ante to joining the cartel~ This gives rise to 
complicated problems of how to split the joint cartel profit 
and of whether members are ~illing to reveal their information 
truthfully. Roberts(1985) considers a model of cartel behaviour 
with adverse selection. where firms observes a perfect signal 
before forming a cartel. In the model firms bargain over the 
split of profits. As bargaining power is related to the private 
information of the firms. full revelation of information within 
the cartel may not take place. 
Regarding the second question. the answer is that was this 
possible. all firms would want to first join the cartel. get 
the information and then leave again. casting further doubt on 
solutions where is not the case that all firms are in the 
stable cartel. For the present one could assume that the 
strategy was choosen by an external coordination body (some 
models of information sharing consider trade associations) and 
cartel members were only told what to produce. 7 ) 
We have mainly concentrated on the case where all firms in the 
industry would be in a stable cartel. This is motivated by.the 
lack of method by which a partial cartel would-arise. because 
when profit"of ~ cartel firm is increasing in the number of 
cartel members. follower firm profit exceeds cartel member 
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profit. Allowing side-payments changes this. As total profits 
when a cartel exists is higher than in the Cournot equilibrium 
(compare (18) and (25). noting that (25) is a lower bound on 
per firm profits under cartellisation) there is some scope for 
this. When side~payments are allowed. the model does. though. 
take a different character. regardless of whether firms learn 
their information before or after joining a cartel. The problem 
becomes whether a mechanism can be designed such that all firms 
cooperate and reveal their private information fully. On the 
revelation principle with side-payments in a model of cartel 
behaviour. see Roberts(1985). 
For future research. it would be of interest to consider a more 
dynamic structure in which firms learn about each others 
information more gradually. In such a case the Stackelberg 
solution concept may prove less usefull. In the present case. 
one could see the model as one in which there is a new and 
uncorrelated shock to demand in each period. Going back to the 
alternative interRretation of the game in section 2.1. one 
might have that information within the cartel was revealed bit 
by bit in the bargaining stage. 
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Footnotes. 
1) If we assume that followers choose their strategy 
simultaneously, acting as Cournot-Nash players is the best they 
can do. 
2) <x> denotes the integer part of x. 
3) Alternatively (13) could have been assumed~ and the the 
distribution in (11) and (12) chosen such that they were 
consistent with (13). As shown in Ericson(1969) and used in 
Li(1985), (13) is true for other distributions than the normal. 
4) Summing (21) and (28) we get that, for given t, t
c
' this is 
only positive for k close to n (and always positive if k~n-2 ). 
Thus selling of information would in some cases be profitable. 
5) It is worth noting the difference between full, partial and 
no revelation. Write the output of the cartel as a function of 
its observed joint singal as Q (S ). If S =Q-1 exists, we say 
c c c c 
that S is fully revealed by Q . If the set ~ = {S IQ =Q (S )}, 
c c c c c c 
i.e. the set of signals which could have given rise to the 
observed output level, is not a singleton, observing Q does 
c 
not fully reveal S . If ~ is a proper subset of the set of all 
c 
possible singals, observing Q does contain some information 
c 
about S , and we say that Q is partially revealing. This 
c c 
information can be valuable if e.g. ~ is a closed subset of ffi. 
If either ~ is identical to the set of possible signals or if 
Q is not a function of S (e.g. a constant), we have a case of 
c c 
no revelation. 
6) There is also equilibria which may be partially revealing. 
In these equilibria the leaders choice of output as a function 
of its signal is either discontinuous or bounded. 
1) If problems of firms inferrring the joint information from 
this arose, one could arbitrarily assume that the cartel output 
was shared out by some random mechanism, unknown to the 
individual member. 
Appendix III.A. 
Let: 
L - 3n + 1 - j n 2-2n-1 4 
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We want to show that for n > 4. L is not an integer. For n = 5. 
L ~ 3.29. For n ~ 6 we have: 
n-l > j n 2-2n-1 > n-2 
implying 
X 2n+3 > L > 2n+2 
--4- -4-- Y 
1 1 Now X - Y = 4· Also either Y is an integer or Y + 2 is an 
integer. Hence L cannot be an integer. 
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CHAPTER IV 
A Two Stage Duopoly Model With Uncertainty. 
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1. Introduction. 
Recently oligopoly models incorporating long and short run 
aspects have been the focus of some attention. These have been 
two stage games where firms in the first stage choose capacity 
or short run cost functions. corresponding to the notion that 
capital is commited prior to production. In the second stage 
firms firms have chosen either prices or quantities. 
The first and most striking result for this type of models was 
Kreps and Scheinkman(1983). who shoved that the unique Nash 
equilibrium in a model where ·firms first choose capacity and 
then prices. correspond to the equilibrium in the one-shot 
Cournot oligopoly model. This was seen as a strong defence of 
the use of the Cournot oligopoly model. as well as offering a 
reinterpretation. 
Later Dixon(1985.1986a proposition 4b) and Vives(1986) have 
generalised the model. allowing for some flexibility of 
production in the second stage. They show that results ranging 
from Cournot to Bertrand (Nash in prices) are possible. 
depending on the ease with which capacity can be extended in 
the second stage. Further Davidson and-Deneckere(1986) have 
shovn that the result hinges critically on the assumed 
rationing scheme. that is. the way in which consumers are 
rationed when demand exceeds supply at the lowest price. 
Davidson and Deneckere(1986) show that with any other rationing 
scheme than .. the one used in Kreps and Scheinkman(1983). no pure 
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strategy equilibrium exists. 
We are going to ext~nd the model by introducing uncertainty on 
the demand side. This is done for two reasons. Firstly to test 
the robustness of the models. S~condly, the model is especially 
interesting if one wishes to consider information transmission 
as it allows both voluntary and involuntary information 
transmission. In order to consider private information, the 
model has to be solved under uncertainty. As this throws up 
some interesting results we have chosen to present these 
seperatly. Private information is considered in chapter V 
below. 
The main result of the paper is that no pure strategy 
equilibrium exists. This is true regardless of whether the 
realisation of the stochastic parameter is known after the 
first stage or after the second stage. Secondly a mixed 
strategy equilibrium exists. As an example, we characterise the 
equilibrium when the stochastic parameter has an uniform 
distribution. 
The paper is organised as follows. The model is described in 
section 2. In section 3 the model is solved under the 
assumption that the realisation of the random variable is not 
known untill after the second stage. In section 4 the model is 
solved under the assumption that the realisation is known prior 
to choosing prices. Section 5 contains an example where the 
random variable is assumed to have a uniform distribution. 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. The model. 
We are considering a two stage duopoly model. In the first 
stage each firm simultaneously chooses a capacity level k i 
(i=l,2). Firm i can produce up to the capacity level at 
constant costs, normalised to zero. The cost of producing 
beyond is assumed prohibitively high. The costs of installing 
capacity k i is b(k i ), where b is assumed convex and 
increasing. After the first stage, the capacities of the two 
firms are made known to all. 
In the second stage capacities are fixed. Firms simultaneously 
choose a price at which they are willing to supply up to their 
capacity limits. Demand is given by: 
p = a - Q = a - q - q 1 2 
where P is price, qi output of firm i and a is a random 
variable having density function f(a) with support [a~,au]' 
(1) 
As total demand at the lowest price cannot always be met, we 
have to choose a rationing rule. For a very thorough treatment 
of contingent demand, see Dixon(1981). In the oligopoly 
literature two different rules have been employed. The first 
rule, which we following Dixon(1981) denote rule CCD 
(compensated contingent demand)l), is described in Levitan and 
Shubik(1912) and used in Krebs and Scheinkman(1983), Gelman and 
Salop(1983), Dixon(1984) and Osborne and Pitchik(1986). It says 
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that demand facing firm i when firm j has capacity k j is 
a - P P. < P j i ~ 
d 
°i(a-P i } Pi P j (2) qi(P i } = = 
max{O.a-Pi-k j } Pi > P j 
where 0i ( O~oi~l. °1+°2 =1 ) is either 1/2 assuming that 
consumers cannot tell which firm has the larger capacity and 
k i hence choose store at random. or 0i= k +k . The latter is more 
1 2 
convenient to work with as it gives fewer contingencies when 
P i =P2 and k 1#k2 . The rationing rule corresponds to moving the 
vertical axis in a usual demand diagram to the point where 
d 
output equals the capacity of firm j. In figure 1 below qi(P i } 
is the heavy drawn line. 
figure 1 
Note that we assume that there are no income effects. as these 
would "twist" the demand curve. This rationing rule is the 
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simplest to work with and can be given two interpretations, 
depending on the assumption about how aggregate demand is 
formed. If there is a large number of identical consumers, the 
rule allows each to buy the same fraction of the capacity k i . 
This is the "limit two per customer" rule. Alternatively, if 
there is a large number of heterogeneous consumers, each 
demanding one unit of the good if the price is below their 
reservation price, it corresponds to assuming that the order in 
which consumers arrive at the queue depends positiv~ly on their 
reservation price. 
The other rationing rule, which we following Dixon(1987) denote 
ED (Edgeworthian demand), originates from Edgeworth(1925)2). 
Independent of whether consumers are homogeneous or 
heterogeneous, a random selection is allowed to-purchase their 
entire demand. This is a kind of first corne first served rule 
where the place in the queue is allotted randomly.- The 
randomness of the place in the queue may possibly introduce a 
random el~ment to residual demand~ One way to make the 
randomness harmless is to assume that -all consumers are 
identical. Alternatively, as noted in Dixon(1987)~ the 
contingent demnad becomes non-random if households have 
identical homothetic preferences and there is no marginal 
consumer, i.e.- no consumer who can only purchase part of his 
demand from one firm. As we are treating contingent demand-as 
having n~ randomness arising from the rationing rule, we are 
implicitly assuming that consumers preferences are identical 
and homothetic~ The rule is used in Allen and-Hellwig(1986), 
Dixon(1984), Gelman and Salop(1983) and Davidson and 
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Deneckere(1986). The rule can be written as: 
-a - P P. < P j i 1 
d 
°i(a-P i ) Pi P j qi(P i ) = = (3) 
a-P 3) 
max{O. i Pi > P j --(a-P -k )} a-P j j j 
'd We show qi(P i ) as the heavy drawn line in figure 2 below. 
figure 2 
Both rules are considered below. 4 ) Note. though. that the rule 
CCD is much simpler to work with because the residual demand of 
firm i depends on the price-of firm j in a very trivial manner. 
as it only affects the point of discontinuity of the demand 
function. 
Throughout most of the paper. we assume that the realisation of 
a is made known to all firms only after the second stage. Thus 
both capacities and prices are chosen prior to knowing a. In 
section 4 below we shall. though. briefly consider a case where 
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a is made known after the first stage. Hence prices are chosen 
under full 'information. 
Firms are assumed risk neutral and maximise expected value of 
profits. 
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3. Realisation known after stage 2. 
We consider subgame perfect equilibria. The pricing stage 
constitutes a proper subgame, and is solved first. 
3.1 The pricing subgame 
In this stage capacities kl and k2 are known and fixed. The 
strategy set Ai of firm i is 
a } 
u 
i=I,2 
Given rationing scheme CCD profits can be written as: 
at a J Pi(a-Pi)f(a)da + 1 .. U P i k i £ (a) da Pi<P j {4} 
al! a i 
" 
a k a 
E(lli(Pi,P j » = I Pi(a-Pi)kif{a)da + f"uPikif{a)da Pi=P j (5) 
at! a 
A. 
a a 
J~Pi{a-Pi-kj)f{a)da + J"UPikif{a)da Pi>P j (6) 
a i a 
" 
where a = P + k, the a given Pi at which total capacity is 
A. 
exactly exhausted: a i = Pi + ki' the a given Pi<P j where i's 
capacity is exactl~exhausted; a i = Pi + kj' the a given Pi>P j 
where i's demand starts becomming positive: and k=k 1+k2 is 
total capaoity: 
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Given rationing rule ED profits can be written as: 
a 
+ f .. u Pi kif (a) da 
a i 
a 
+ f .. up i kif (a) da 
a 
where P is the positive root solving 
Pi<P j 
Bacause of the uncertain demand and the need for a rationing 
scheme it is better to charge a price slightly lower than the 
other firm as this ensures that the firm sells first. This indi 
cates that equilibria in which firms charge the same price are 
unlikely to exist. 
Proposition 1: 
In the pricing stage. if 
is: 
a 
u 
the unique pure strategy equilibrium 
P1 = P2 = 0 
(ii)max[k 1 .k2 ] < au no pure strategy equilibrium exists. 
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Proof: 
See appendix IV.A. 
Let Bi = { Pi € ffi+ I Pi ~ max(O.a,-k} }. i=I.2. the set of 
prices where even at the lowest- realisation of a demand can be 
fully met. In the proof we use the following lemma: 
Lemma 1. 
The set of points of discontinuity of the paYQff f.unction A7* 
is: 
iJl!j. i=I.2. 
Proof; 
See appendix IV.A. 
Corollary 1. 
Proof: 
See appendix IV.A. 
Thus the discontinuity occurs on the diagonal in the price 
space elsewhere the payoff ftinction is co.ntinuous. Further. at 
the point of discontinuity. if one firms profit falls. the 
profit of the other will rise and vice versa. Thus the 
discontinuity we have is of a kind where the theorems of 
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Dasgupta and Maskin(1986a} for games with discontinous payoffs 
can be applied. 
Proposition 2. 
The pricing stage possesses a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium 
. 
Proof. 
Apply theorem 5b in. Dasgupta and Maskin(1986a),directly. 0 
* * To find the support of the mixed-strategy equilibrium (~i'~j)' 
consider the price whIch firm i would pick if it accepts to set 
the high price (i.e. maximise either (6) or (9)). Denote this 
Pi: 
i=1.2. (10) 
From the proof of proposition 1. we know that this price is non 
negative. Define: 
(11) 
By construction no firm would choose a price higher than P with 
positive probability. Assume that Pi>Pjo Then firm j might pick 
a price P.j€[Pj~Pi] as there is a possibility that firm i.picks 
Pi with positive pr~babilityo The same type of argument goes 
through for firm i. Hence P is the supremum of the support of 
~~. i~1.2. 
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Define ~i as the solution to 
a 
+ IAu~ikif{a)da = 
a i 
(12) 
~i is the price at which firm i is indifferent between charging 
the lowest price (i.e. undercutting firm j ) or charging the 
highest price. that is the price where firm i stops undercut-
ting. Define: 
(13) 
* Then P is the infimum of the support of ~i i=1.2 as the firm 
with the highest price would never set a price below P and the 
firm with the lower would only gain by raising its price to ~. 
Thus ~7 i=1.2. has support [P.P]. 
Proposition 3. 
~7 i=I.2. is atomless on ]~.P]. 
Proof: 
* If ~i has an atom at Pi then there is a positive probability of 
a tie at that price. But then. from corollary 1. one firm would 
prefer to shift some mass just below that price. o 
The only possibility of an atom is at P. Assume without loss of 
generality that ~i > ~j. Then it is possible that ~jhave a 
mass point at P 
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Finally if ki=k j . we have: 
Proposition 4. 
If capacities are identical. the pricing stage possesses a 
- * * * symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (~ .~ ). and ~ is 
atomless on [~.P]. 
Proof. 
Apply theorem 6. in Dasgupta and Maskin(l986a}. o 
* * Write the mixed-strategy equilibrium as (~i'~j)' where * ~i is a 
probability distribution with support [~.P]. Note from 
(l3) that P and P are both functions of k i and k j and 
furthermore: 
(ll) and 
{ fl(ki·k j } for ki~kj P(ki,k j } = {14} gl(ki,k j } for ki<k j 
{ f 2 (k i ,k j } for ki~kj P(ki,k j } = (lS) g2(k i ,k j } for ki<k j 
where. fl=gl and f 2 =g2 for ki=kj" 
For rationing scheme CCD, the payoff of the second stage_is 
particularly simple because the price of the other firm only 
enter to determine the point of discontinuity. 
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With rationing scheme {E} we get: 
E{I1. {ki.k.}} 
1 J 
3.2 The capacity stage. 
a 
u 
J 
f3 
Now it is clear from {16} and {11} above together with the 
{16} 
(17) 
convexity of the cost of capacity that profits are continous 
and concave in ki.k j • but also that at the point ki=kj.they are 
not differentiable. By e.g. theorem 1 reported in Dasgupta and 
Maskin{1986a}. a pure strategy equilibrium exists in this 
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stage. 
Byond the existence of an equilibrium in the two stage game, 
consisting of a pure strategy choice of capacities and a mixed 
strategy choice or prices, the model, although simple, is too 
general for anything else to be said. To get some more results 
we turn to a specific dis"tribution for a in section 5. Before 
turning to that we asses the effect of changing the information 
structure such that the realisation oJ a is known after the 
capacity stage. 
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4. Relisation known after stage 1. 
One possible way to obtain a pure strategy equilibrium in the 
pricing stage is to assume that the realisation of a is made 
known after stage 1. If this is the case. our stage 2 becomes 
deterministic and is a simple version of Osborne and 
Pitchik(1986). They showed that given capacities and demand. 
there is a range of capacities which gives rise to a pure 
strategy equ~lib~ium in the second stage. The pure strategy 
equilibrium arise when either the smaller of the capacties are 
larger than demand at zero price. ( cf. proposition 1 case (i) 
above) or if capacity is such that the price which clears the 
market at full capacity is preferred to the optimal price of a 
firm consciously setting the higher price. In the other cases. 
no pure strategy equilibrium exists. It is the second case of 
pure strategy equilibria which are of interest here. 
Osborne and Pitchik(1986) also show that in a pure strategy 
equilibrium of the second kind. the equilibrium price is the 
one which clears the market at full capacity. Thus if we are to 
get a pure strategy equilibrium. the solution to the second 
stage is 
P* _- k k a - 1 - 2' 
* As a is assumed known with certainty in the second stage. P is 
nonrandom. Expected payoff in stage 1 can given capacities be 
written as: 
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i=1.2, i#j. (18) 
Maximising this with respect to ki' we get: 
i=1,2. (19) 
We now have to show that if k i as given by (19) is chosen in 
the first stage, the price chosen in the second stage will be: 
p* 2 
= a - 3"E(a) (20) 
* Firm i would never set a price below P as this would leave 
positive excess demand. Let firm i choose the higher price Pi. 
We have to show that p* is a best reply to Pi for all a. Pi is 
the solution to: 
We get: 
I k* nserting i 
indeterminate 
a-k ~ a - k j ~ Pi > a - k 
a - k ~ Pi 
(21) 
(22) 
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indeterminated Pi > a -
1 3'.E(a) 
a 1 1 ~ Pi > a -
2 (23) Pi = 2" - 6· E(a) a - 3'.E(a) 3'·E(a) 
2 2 ~ Pi a - 3'.E(a) a - 3'.E(a) 
1 2 '" Note that for a - 3'.E(a) ~ Pi > a - 3'.E(a). Pi has only got a 
well defined interior solution for a € [ae.E(a)]. 
* To show that Pi is an equilibrium for some support [ai.a~] we 
must show that 
2 But we know that for Pi > a - 3'.E(a). 
a ~ E(a). Such a case exist i a has a positive variance. Hence. 
h i t h h P > P* d t ere ex s s an a suc t at i i an no pure strategy 
equilibrium exists. 
A somewhat related model is considered in Harris and 
Lewis(1982). They consider a two-stage model where firms choose 
investment (or short-run cost function) in the first stage and 
output in the second stage. As in the presented model. firms 
are uncertain about the intercept of a common inverse demand 
function about which they observe a private signal. Further as 
in this section. firms are informed about the realisation of 
the random variable prior to the second stage. They showed the 
existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy equilibrium. This 
suggests that the choice of strategic variable can strongly 
influence the outcomes of the present model. 
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5. Uniform distributed random variable. 
Assume that a has a uniform distribution on [al,auJ. Further 
assume that firms choose the rationing scheme CCD. Then we can 
write expected profits of firm i as 
Pik i if Pi~Pj (24) 
E(l1 i (P i ,P j » P iki -
Pi k i 2 if Pi=P j . (25) = 2A·i{·(a2-k-P i } 
Pik i -
Pi 2 
2A·(a2-k-P i } if Pi>P j (26) 
From section 3 we know that a mixed strategy equilibrium exists 
in the second stage. Proceeding as in section 3.1 we can find 
the support of this. To find the supremum of· the support·P, 
maximise (26) with respect to Pi" Solving we get: 
(27) 
From (11) P = ma·x{Pi,P j }" Assume without loss of. generality 
that ki~kj~ Then P = Pi" 
To find the infemum, inserting in (12) and solving yields: 
~i = Pi -
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Pi(at - k - Pi} 
(at - k - 3Pi) 
Using (21) we can write this as: 
~i = ~ (at - k) ) 0 (29) 
From (13). the infimum is ~ = max{Pi'~j}. Again. without loss 
of generality assume that ki'~ k j . Now 
o~i o~i oP i 
= - + --.--
ok i oPi oki 
where k. is held constant. Then the first term is zero and the 
third is positive. From (29): 
= ) 0 
The sign follows from Pi ~ (ttt - k)for A)O. Hence ~i is 
increasing in k i and it follows that P = ~i. Thus we can write 
the support of the mixed-strategy equilibrium as 
Assume that firm j chooses mixed strategy F(P j ). Expected 
profit of firm i from choosing pure strategy Pi is: 
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E(ll i (P i ,F(P j ») 
We must show that F(-) is a distribution function. Assume this 
to be the case. In equilibrium, the profit of firm i must be 
constant for all Pi € [~,P]. We can write this as: 
We require that F(~) = 0 and F(P) = 1 and 8F(-) > 0 for 8P i 
Pi€[P,P]. Inserting we find: 
F(~) 
F(P) 
Further 
= 0 
= 1 
<=::> IIi = P k i 
. <=::> Il i = P k i 
-
= (a.e 
Pi (3P-a .e+k )-2p2 
Pi(Pi-a.e+k ) 
1 
3P -at+k 
P (a.e - 2A -
2(P )2 
k i 
- k - 3P) 
3P i - a .e+k 
3P -a.e+k 
-2 2 2 2P [3Pi-2Pi(a.e-k)+(a.e-k) ] 
k - P )2 
= P k i 
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Rewrite this as 
where x = (a2-k). Now by inspection Z{P i ) is convex, 
O. Hence Z{Pi»O, which implies that ~~(.) > o. 
i 
and Z i > m n 
So F{·} is a distributipn function, and we have found the mixed 
strategy of firm 2. We find the mixed strategy of firm 1 in the 
same way. In summary, the equilibrium mixed strategies of the 
second stage are: 
- -2 3P i -a2+k F{P i } 
P i {3P-a2+k}-2P 
= P i {P i -a2+k} 3P -a2+k 
- -2 3P i -a2+k G{P i } 
P i {3P-a2+k)-2P 
= P i {P i -a2+k} 3P -a2+k 
The equilibrium payoffs are: 
(30) 
This completely solves the pricing stage. 
Assume constant per unit cost of installing capacity, for 
simplicity s~t equal to zero. Further assume that each firm 
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believes that the other firms choice of capacity is unaffected 
by its choice, a reasonable assumption given that the 
capacities are chosen simultaneously. Then the problem of firm 
i is to maximise (30). 
The corresponding first order condition for ki~kj is 
(31) 
all i 2 2 (aJ?-k)2.ki _ (aJ?-k)
3 
ak i 
= 3"{aJ? - k) - -k + 3 i 9A k j 27Ak j 
[ ~ + [aJ?-k] 2 a -k ].CP{k j ) + J? 27Ak j 9A (32) 
* * An equilibrium in the capacity stage is a pair ki' k j such that 
k7 = ri{k~) and k~ = r j {k7), where r i , rj are the reaction 
correspondences. ri{k j ) is the k i which solves either (31) when 
ki~kj or (32) when ki<k j for a given k j . 
It is not possible to find explicit expressions for the 
correspondence. from (31) and (32). Below in figure 3 we have 
shown the correspondences for given values of aJ? and au. Three 
points merit special attention. These are the three equilibria, 
marked a, band c. 7he fourth point, d, is not an equilibrium 
but included in the following for completeness. 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
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, 
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Figure 3. Reaction correspondences. 
, 
c· 
To find analytical expressions fo~ the three equilibria, we 
solve for the four cases using (31) and (32) above. Although 
(31) and (32) are non-linear. we can find unique solutions to 
all four cases. These are given in table 1 below. 
-99-
TABLE 1. 
case a b c d 
l' ( j 2 21) 1 1 1 2 1 1 k i --a +-- A --a +--11. --a + --A 15 A+4ae+ ae+BaeA+A 3 e 2 3 e 3 3 e 6 
1 ( j 2 21) 1 1 1 1 1 2 k j --a +-- A --a +-- A --a +--11. 15 A+4ae+ ae+BaeA+A 3 e 2 3 e 6 3 e 3 
(~-ae+~-A ]3 -2.-_ (4ae+A:j a e +Bae A+A2 ]3 
ITi 
1 2 (!-a +!_A)2 
--a 9 e 3 e 6 1 2 153 ae+A+j a~+BaeA+A2 --a +--11. 3 e 3 
(~-ae+~-A ]3 .2-_ (4ae+A+j a e +Bae A+A2 )3 IT j 1 2 (1 1)2 --a --a +--A 9 e 1 2 3 e 6 153 ae+A+j a~+BaeA+A2 --a +--A 3 e 3 
From figure 3 we can also see that band c· are.stable 
equilibria whereas a is not. Now one can readily show that: 
Further. if 
(33) 
Then 
Now (33) holds if A is small relative to ~e.As Var(a) 
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this is related to the case where the variance is sufficiently 
small. In the case where (33)'does not hold both firms prefer 
an asymmetric equilibrium to the symmetric. There is though no 
good bases for choosing one equilibrium over another. 
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6. Concluding remarks. 
In the two stage duopoly model proposed by Kreps and 
Scheinkman(1983), we have shown that under uncertainty, firms 
will not set the same price and hence the analogy with the 
Cournot outcome no longer holds. This is true regardless of 
whether uncertainty was resolved before or after the pricing 
stage. This strengthens the conclusion in Davidson and 
Deneckere(1986) that the result in Kreps and Scheinkman(1983) 
is sensitive to changes in the assumptions of the model. 
The fact that we get a mixed strategy equilibrium implies that 
at an instant. producers of a homogeneous good almost always 
charge a different price. Another interesting result. which 
comes from our example in section 5. is that the equilibrium is 
possibly asymmetric with firms choosing different capacities. 
As noted in section 4. Harris and Lewis(1982) showed that a 
pure strategy equilibrium exists if the strategic variable in 
the second stage is output level. This indicates that the 
choice af prices as strategic variables seriously complicates 
the model. and thus requires at least some justification. 
The choice of strategic variable under uncertainty is closely 
related to the slope of the inverse demand curve. If it is 
relatively steep. ,the variance of demand for a given price is 
smaller than the variance of the price for a given output 
level. This suggests that if firms are concerned about the 
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variance of profits, then the steeper the inverse demand curve, 
the more likely are firms to prefer to set prices. 
Further in many cases firms set both the price and their 
capacity (e.g. newspapers, where both the price and the number 
of issues are printed on the frontpage). The model presented 
above is then the case where the capacity is committed before 
prices rather than simultaneously. 
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Footnotes. 
1) The rule is sometimes referred to as reservation price 
rationing or parallel rationing. 
2) Sometimes referred to as random rationing or proportional 
rationing. 
3) Residual demand in this case can be written in a more 
familiar form. Let Q(P) be total demand at P. Then we can write 
residual demand as: 
q!(P i ) = Q(P i )- [1 - Q(~J)] J 
This is the form given in eg; Dixon(19S7. equation 1.2). 
4) It could be argued that the choice of rule should be 
endogenised. Whether or not this is possible depends on the 
assumptions made about the consumers. If consumers are 
heterogeneous and the good is sold on a first come first served 
basis. the difference between the two schemes is the sequence 
in which consumers arrive at the queue or shop. This is 
exogeneous to the firm. When the consumers ~re homogeneous. the 
question of endogeneity of the rule has more merit as it 1s a 
choice between first come first served and proportional 
rationing. but in a sense the question is outside the present 
model. as we would expect the choice to depend on dynamic 
factors such as consumer loyality etc. 
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Appendix IV.A. 
Proof of proposition 1, lemma t and corollary 1. 
First we establist lemma 1, the condition under which there are 
discontinuities in the payoff function as given by either 
(4},(5) and (6) or (7), (8) and {9}. The corollary follows from 
this proof. Finally we prove the proposition using the lemma. 
Proof of lemma 1.: 
Note that for Pi#P j , E(Ui(Pi,P j » is continous in Pi. Let A** 
be the set of points of discontinuity. Then we know 
Continuity from below requires: 
Pj+k i au . 
. J Pj(a-Pj}f(a}da + J ~jkif(a)da 
a~ Pj+k i 
= 
Pj+k au 
J Pj(a-Pj}~f(a)da + I Pjkif(a}da 
a~ Pj+k 
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P.=o 
J 
or 
a-P PjJ+k i a-P 
~ef(a)da - ~ef(a)da k i k 
or 
al! 
Pj+k 
+ J ef(a)da-
Pj+k i 
a-P TJ-~f(a}da = 0 
k+P -a ~ ef(a)da = 0 
As both terms are positive. the last equality can only hold if 
P j ~ al!-k. Thus for P j € Bj • the payoff function is continous 
from below. Note that this holds for both types of rationing 
schemes. as (4) and (7) and (5) and (8) are identical. 
Continuity from above for scheme (8): 
Pj+k au 
J Pj(a-Pj-kj}f(a}da + J Pjkif(a}da 
Pj+k j Pj+k 
= 
P.=O 
J 
or 
or 
-106-
a-P -k 
j jef(a)da-k i 
Pj+k 
J a-P TJ-ef(a)da = 0 
(a-P -k )ek 
j j j~f(a)da = 0 kek j 
As the first expression is non-negative and the second non-
positive, only for Pj=O or P j ~ al-k does the equality hold. 
Comtinuity for scheme (E): 
Pj+k au 
= J Pj(a-Pj)~f(a)da + J P(a)da 
a l Pj+k 
~ = P j + k. Then we can 
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write the above as: 
Pj+k au J Pj(a-Pj-kj)f(a)da + J Pjkif(a)da 
Pj+k j Pj+k 
which corrresponds to the above case (S). From this follows 
that for 
P j € Bj the payoff function is continuous. Hence lemma 1 
follows. 
The corollary follows immediately from the above. 
Proof of proposition 1. 
We need to show that if a~-k > 0 and Pj~ a~-k. firm i would 
choose to set Pi > a~-k so that no equilibrium exists for 
(Pi.P j ) € (BixBj)\{(O.O)}. Now for (Pi.P j ) € BiXBj both firms 
can always sell at their capacity level. Hence firm i would 
never .set a price P i < a~-k. Consider P i = a~-k. If firm i 
contemplates increasing Pi it must be maximising either (6) or 
Maxi m is i ng (6) w. r . t . P i- we ge t : 
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Pj+k Pj+k 
= k i - k i J f(a)da + 
al! 
J (a-k j -2 eP i )e f (a)da 
13 
8E(11 . ) 
1 > 0, implying that firm i wants to 
increase its price. 
Maximising (9) w.r.t. Pi we get: 
= 
al!-P j 1 j 2 13 = 2 - + _e (a -P) - 4 e (P k + (an-k)(Pj+~j) 2 l! j j j ~ 
1 Now the term under the square root is less that 2 e (al!-P j ) as 
Pj<al!-k. Hence l3<al! implying that at Pi=al!-k, 
This implies that no equilibrium exists with 
It only remains to be shown in which cases (Pi,P j ) = (0,0) as 
in all otheT cases there is a discontinuity in the payoff. 
function and no pure strategy equilibrium exists. 
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Assume that k j < au. If Pj=O. there exists a Pi>O such that 
d qi(Pi,O} > 0 for some a € [a 2 .au ]. Hence for (Pi.P j ) = (O.O) to 
be an equilibrium we must have: 
min[k .. k.] ~ a 
1 J U 
which is part (i) of proposition 1. This concludes the proof. 
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CHAPTER V 
Private Information in a Two Stage Duopoly Model. 
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1. Introduction. 
Recently oligopoly models incorporating long and short run 
aspects have been the focus of some attention. Kreps and 
Scheinkman(1983). Davidson and Deneckere(1986). Dixon(1986). 
Harris and Lewis(1982}. Osborne and Pitchik(1986} and 
Vives(1986} have looked at two-stage models. where firms first 
choose capacity or short-run cost functions and then a price at 
which they are willing to trade or ~n o~tput level. Apart from 
Harris and Lewis(1982). these models have been deterministic. 
The models have several nice· features. They embody the idea 
that capacity is a long-run issue and is committed prior to any 
trading. Furthermore. prices rather than quantities can be 
strategic variables. even if the firms are producing a 
homogeneous product. Finally. given the sequential structure of 
the model. if firms possess any private information prior to 
choosing capacities. their choice of capacities will embody 
this information. By observing the capacity choices of the 
other firms. a firm can learn ~bme of their information. This 
allows us to consider involuntary information transmission. 
Apart from considering information transmission. it is of 
considerable interest to asses the impact of uncertainty and 
private information on the results of these analysis. Firstly 
is represents a step t6wards greater realism. Secondly. it is 
important to check the roubu.stness of the models. Thirdly. 
models of imperfect competition are increasingly being used as 
one way to obtain a micro economic foundation of macro 
economics. In connection with this. the short-run - long-run 
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models seems interesting because both investments and price 
formation is explicitly modelled. As uncertainty and private 
information is seen as an integral part of many of these micro 
foundation models. it is of interest to asses the impact of 
uncertainty. 
The simplest two stage duopoly model was considered in Kreps 
and Scheinkman(1983). Assume that capacity is fixed upwards. 
i.e. once fixed. it cannot be augmente4 at .any cost. and that 
the choice of capacities are made simultaneously and thereafter 
made publicly known. Kreps and Scheinkman(1983} showed that the 
only equilibrium has the two firms choosing the 
Cournot-quantities in the first stage and the prices associated 
with the Cournot duopoly model in the second. 
Dixon(1985} show that if "firms in the first stage choose a 
short-run cost function. in the second stage their output 
level. then depending on the flexibility of the production 
function and the relative price of input factors. all outcomes 
between Bertrand and Cournot are possible. In a less general 
model Vives(1986) gets the same re~ult. 
Osborne and Pitchik(1986} use parallel rationing and show under 
fairlygene~al assumpti~ns that given capacities. k i • k2 with 
kl~k2>O three cases will ~merge. If capacity is large. a pure 
strategy equilibrium exists with zero profits. If capacity is 
in an intermediate range. mixed strategy equilibria exists. If 
capacity i~ small. a pure strategy equilibrium exists. Further 
they show that if the choice of capacity is endogeneous. a pure 
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strategy equilibrium exists. 
Davidson and Deneckere(1986) use a model identical to Kreps and 
Scheinkman(1983) apart from the rationing scheme. They show 
that only for the scheme cho~en by Kreps and Scheinkman does 
one get pure strategy equilibria. For all other schemes 
considered. only mixed strategy equilibria exists. Furthermore 
these are always asymmetric and otherwise identical firms will 
not get the same expected payoff. This makes their,equilibrium 
seem unreasonable. 
The introduction of uncertainty into models of imperfect 
competition give rise to problems of intractability stemming 
from firms not only having to conjecture the behaviour of other 
firms. but also the impact of uncert~inty and private 
information on the strategy choices of other firms. Models 
using model consistent (or rational) expectations have been 
studied in e.g. Ponssard(1979). Further there has been an 
interest in models of differential information. to assess the 
extent to which firms wish to share information. In a series of 
papers Clarke(1983a.b). Gal-Or(1985.1986). Li(1985). Novshek 
and Sonnenshein(1982). Shapiro(1985) and Vives(1984). it has 
been shown that firms do not generally wish to share 
information voluntarily. Firms may though part with their 
information involuntarily by their choice of strategy. This 
idea will be pursued here by considering a two stage duopoly 
model. 
The effect of introducing uncertainty in the Kreps and 
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Scheinkman(1983) model was analysed chapter IV. It was shown 
that no pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists in the pricing 
stage. but a mixe strategy equilibrium exists. 
Analysing the effect of private information in a model with 
mixed strategy equilibrium is too complicated. Secondly it is 
difficult to interpret the meaning of a mixed strategy 
equilibrium. Varian(1982) attempts to interpret it as random 
sales. but that does not seem convincing. Furth~r as has been 
pointed out in Davidson and Deneckere(1986). mixed strategy 
equilibrium are very unstable and essentially requires the 
consumer to react quicker than the producer such that low price 
firms have sold out before they can raise their price. 
To get a pure strategy equilibrium we loosely speaking assume 
that a firm when contemplating uncercutting by an infinitesimal 
amount considers the effect of the reSUlting caos from price 
cutting. This assumption is in the spirit of an assumption 
often made in price-setting duopoly models with no pure 
strategy equilibria. In location models e.g. Novshek(1980) and 
Archibald'et al(1986) the assumption is often referred to as 
the no-mill-price-undercutting rule. A similar asssumption is 
made in Eaton and Kierzkowski(1984) and Ireland(1987). 
In a related paper Harris and Lewis(1982) assumed that firms 
fi~st chose investment (or short-run cost functi~ns) then 
quantities. Firms observe a signal on demand prior to choosing 
their investment and observe the realisation of the random 
variable prior to choosing output levels. They show the 
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existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy equilibrium in 
their model. 
The paper is organised as follows. The model is described in 
section 2. In section 3 we show that an endogeneous high price 
setter exists. The firm setting the high price is the firm with 
the largest capacity. This implies that an endogeneous 
Stackelberg leader exists in the present model: This firm also 
earns the highest profit. Having solved the pricing stage. 
firms choose capacities to maximise profits assuming that the 
choice of the other firm is independent of their own choice. 
This assumption is reasonable given a simultaneous choice of 
capacity. We show that if the variance of the random parameter 
is not too large relative to the infimum of its support. a 
symmetric solution exists. which have firms choosing higher 
capacities than on average in the Cournot case. Else only 
asymmetric equilibria exists. To make this meaningfull we could 
reinterpret the model in terms of entry. 
In section 4 we consider the effect of private information. 
Private information in this context is knowing that the random 
variable will lie within a subset of its support. For example. 
a firm may know whether the realisation of the random variable 
will lie in' the upper or lower half of its range. In the first 
set of examples it is assumed that only one of the firm has any 
private information. We first consider a special example. which 
has an analytical solution. Secondly we solve some numerical 
examples. These indicate that the better informed does not have 
an incentive to share its information with the worse informed. 
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More surpricingly. we find that there are cases where the worse 
informed has no incentive to get this information. Finally we 
consider some examples where both have access to some private 
information. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2. The model. 
We are considering a two stage duopoly model. In the first 
stage each firm simultaneously chooses a capacity level k i 
(i=I,2). Firms can produce up to k. at constant per unit costs, 
1 
normalised to zero. Production above the capacity limit implies 
prohibitively high costs. The costs of installing capacity k i 
be b(k i }, where b is assumed convex. 
In the second stage capacities are fixed. Firms simultaneously 
choose a price at which they are willing to sell up to their 
capacity limit. Demand is given by: 
P = a - Q = a - q - q 1 2 
where P is price, qi output of firm i and a is a randrim 
variable having an uniform distribution on [ai' au]· .. 
As total demand at the lowest price cannot always be met, we 
have to choose a rationing rule. We choose the one used in 
(1) 
Kreps and Scheinkman{1983}, often called parallel rationing. It 
says that demand facing firm i when firm j .has capacity k j is 
a - P Pi < P j i 
d 6 i {a-P i } Pi P j qi(P i } = = (2) 
max{O,a-Pi-k j } P. > P j 1 
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consumers cannot tell which firm has the larger capacity and 
k i 
or 0i= k +k . The latter is more 
1 2 
hence choose store at random. 
convenient to work with as it gives fewer contingencies when 
Pl=P2 and k l ¢k2 . The rationing rule is illustrated in figur 1 
below: 
Pj --------""'---...;:,.".. 
figure 1 
Note that we assume that there are no income effects. as these 
would "twist" the demand curve. This rationing rule is the 
simplest to work with and can be given two interpretations. 
depending on the assumption about how aggregate demand is 
formed. If there are a large number of identical consumers. the 
rule allows each to buy the same fraction of the capacity k i . 
This is the "limit two per customer" rule. Alternatively •. if 
there are a large number of heterogeneous .consumers. each 
demanding one unit of the good if the price is below their 
reservation price. it corresponds to assuming that the order in 
which consumers arrive at the queue depends positively on their 
reservation price l }. 
-119-
Throughout the paper, we assume that the realisation of a is 
made known to all firms only after the second stage. Thus both 
capacities and prices are chosen prior to knowing a. 
Firms are assumed risk neutral and maximise expected value of 
profits. 
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3. The solution to the model. 
As we showed in chapter IV, no_pure strategy equilibrium exist 
in which firms charge the same price. This result follows from 
uncertainty creating a mass-point of demand just below any 
given price for which capacity is not always fully exhausted. 
At Pi=P j , given capacities, firms share the fluctuation in 
demand. Specifically, there will be realisations of demand 
where neither firm will be able to sell up to their capacity 
limit. At Pi=Pj+e, e)O, firm i sells first and will not bear 
the same share of a reduction of demand as when prices are 
equal. Firm j will bear all (or most) of the fluctuation in 
demand. Hence any price Pi=P j at which there are realisations 
of demand that do not allow firms to sell up to their capacity 
level will be undercut. 
We need an equilibrium concept which will drive a wedge between 
the two prices. To this end we assume that firms conjecture the 
optimal response of the other firm. Thus the low price firm 
must choose a sufficiently low price that it does not trigger 
off a price war2). We assume that the equilibrium outcome of a 
price war is predictable. Thus we do in some sense require that 
th~ conjectures are consistent. 
3.1 The pricing stage. 
To reduce the number of contingent cases, assume that 
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included for computational ease and do not affect the results. 
The former requires that firms in a price-setting duopoly never 
finds it optimal to have a capacity so large that the only 
equilibrium price is zero, yielding zero profits. The latter 
only restricts the firms from setting prices so low that even 
in the worst possible case there is general excess demand. 
Finally, Pi€[O,a
u
]' i.e. prices are non-negative and for some a 
demand is non-negative. 
Without loss of generality we concentrate on firm i. Write the 
profit of firm i as: 
1 
1 
Pi+k 
J Pi{a-Pi-kj)da + 
a e 
Pi=P j 
We have two cases to worry about. We can dismiss one easily. 
Consider the case where Pi+k ~ a Then the above reduces to: 
u 
Pi<P j 
Pi=P j 
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Assume that firm i wants to set the high price. First order 
conditions become: 
1 2 This implies that E(ITi(ki,k j }} = 4·(E(a}-k j } . To avoid holding 
excess capacity, firm i would choose k i in the first stage to 
1 
meet residual demand at Pi' i.e. k i = 2 (E(a}-k j ). We assumed 
that Pi ~ au - k 
k i we get: 
a 
u 
which implies that E(a} ~ 
degenerate case. 
a . 
u 
This is only possible for the 
Returning to the case where P i < au - k, we get by integrating 
ou t: 
Pik i Pi<P j 
2 
E(ITi(Pi,P j }} Pi·k i 
1 k i Pi(al-Pi-k} 
Pi=P j = - -.-. 2 k a - a 
u l 
2 
P·k -
1 P i (a2-P i -k} Pi>P j -. i i 2 a - a 
u l 
Maximising (5) with respect to Pi we get the following first 
and second order eondition. 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
a - a 
u 2 
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Solving (6) we get the following solutions: 
Inserting (8) and (9) in (1) we find that (8) is a local 
(1) 
(8) 
(9) 
maximum, (9) a local minimum. Inserting back in (5) we get firm 
i's optimal profits as a function of the pair of capacities. 
(10) 
where for notational simplicity: 
(11) 
* To show that Pi given in (8) is the global maximum, note first 
2 from (1) .that for Pi >3· (a2-k) , E(IT(Pi,p j )) is concave. Thus we 
need only compare- (10) to profits at the lower bound on Pi' 
Pi=O. From (~)-(5) E(IT(O,P j )) = O. It is not possible to show 
that (10) is generally positive. Clearly the second term is 
always positive so a sufficient condition is a 2 ~ k. When we 
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solve the first stage we have to make shure that the capacities 
are such that profits given by (10) are positive. 
For firm i to be willing to charge the highest price and thus 
take on all the risk. it must not be able to make a higher 
expected profit by undercutting the price of firm j slightly. 
If it undercuts firm j. then by our assumption it sells all its 
capacity. Its profit would be (P j - e}k i . Thus for an 
equilibrium we require ITi > ( P j - e}k i . The highest price of 
firm j compatible with this is: 
(12) 
Using (10) the highest firm j price compatible with an 
equilibrium is: 
(13) 
The corresponding profit is: 
(14) 
Using (10) we get 
(IS) 
This solves the pricing stage. 
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3.2 A Stackelberg type equilibrium. 
Before solving the first stage, consider a model with k i and k j 
fixed. To get an equilibrium in this case, we must show that 
for any ki' kj' one of the firms prefer to set the high price 
while the other prefer to set the low. This follows as we know 
that setting the same price is never optimal. We can interpret 
such an equilibrium in terms of the Stackelberg duopoly model 
where firms choose price sequentially. The question is then 
whether one of the firms is willing to commit itself to a price 
before the other. Such a firm would be an endogeneous 
Stackelberg leader. Clearly this firm would be the low price 
firm, as a high price would be undercut slightly by the other 
firm. Below we shall show that such an endogeneous price leader 
exists. Let superscripts h-and 2 denote high and low price firm 
respectively. We can show the following 
Lemma 1.: 
Proof: 
See appendix V.A. 
From lemma 1 follows that if k i > k j firm j is an endogeneous 
Stackelberg leader, setting the low price. This is so as firm i 
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has no incentive to undercut the low price"of firm j, whereas 
firm j would have an incentive to do so. Thus given our 
equilibrium concept we find that the smaller firm is an 
endogeneous Stackelberg leader, setting the lower price and 
getting the smaller profit. 
Finally when firms have identical capacities, two symmetric 
equilibria exists in which the firms are indifferent between 
setting the high and the low price. 
Keeping the difficulties in justifying a Stackelberg leader in 
mind this resulty is interesting in its own right. 
Stackelberg(1934) points out some very special cases where an 
endogeneous leader exists3 ). Endogeneous leaders have also been 
identified by Boyer and Moreaux(1983) and Ireland(1987). 
Boyer and Moreaux(1983) consider a deterministic model with 
linear demand and different but constant marginal costs. Firms 
both announce a price and the quantity they are wiling to sell 
at that price. Their main results are: No pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium exists. If costs are very diferent, the high cost 
firm is driven out of the market. If costs are in an 
intermediate range, the low cost firm is an endogeneous 
Stackelberg leader. If the cost difference is low, both firms 
prefer to be Stackelberg followers. 
Ireland(1987) considers a leadership model where firms produce 
a differentiated product under different costs. Demand is 
discountinous as part of the consumers prefer the low price 
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good. whereas other have preferences over the good and might 
'still buy the dearer good. Because of the mass point in demand. 
no pure strategy equilibrium exists. but a Stackelberg 
equilibrium with the low cost firm as the low price setter 
exists. This result hinges on the cost difference. 
3.3 The capacity stage. 
In section 3.1 we solved the pricing stage. Using the solution 
we now turn to the capacity stage. We initially assumed convex 
capacity costs and it is worth noting that if the fixed 
capacity costs from this stage is taken into account. then 
lemma 1 is not changed. For simplicity we consider only zero 
capacity costs. From {10} and {15} we can write the expected 
profit of firm i as a function of capacities as: 
{16} 
Note that E{rri{ki.k j )} is continuous everywhere in k i but not 
differentiable at ki=k j . Thus the reaction correspondence 
defined implicitely by the first order condition for maximising 
{16} display a discontinuity at ki=k j . The correspondences are 
shown in figure 2,below. 
k j 
, 
" , 
, 
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Figure 2. Reaction correspondences. 
, 
A 
The reaction correpsondence of firm i r(k i ) is given by the 
segments Aa and dD, where Aa comes form maximising the top 
expression in (16) and dD (not including the point d at which 
ki=k j ) comes from maximising the bottom expression in (16). The 
corresponding segments for firm j are Ba and dC. The interest 
centres on the three equilibria marked a, band c in the 
figure. Below we consider these (as well as the last remaining 
case d for completeness) in turn: 
Case (a): Both firms act as if they were going to be the high 
capacity firm, i.e. both firm maximise (10). First order 
conditions are: 
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The second order condition for a maximum is: 
2 2-(aJ!-k) -cp(k i ) 
9A 
i=1.2 (17) 
~ 0 (18) 
We shall only consider the symmetric solution. These are found 
to be: 
k* 1 1 i=l,2 = 3'- a J! + --A i 2 (19) 
k' i = ~- A - (1 + )1 + 4-aJ!/A )2 i=l,2 (20) 
Evaluating (18) at (19) and (20) we get: 
a
211h 1 2 2 i aJ! gaJ!-6aJ!A-15A < 0 ak~2 = - 27A + 9A(aJ!+6A) 
1 
a
211h ( _ 1 )2 > 0 i )1 + 4-a1A 
ak,2 = J! 
i 
Thus (19) is a local maximum and (20) is a local minimum. We 
want to show that (19) is a global maximum. Firstly, ki > k7 
as: . 
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!- [1 ]2 ! + 1 + ~j 1 1 1 + j 1 + 4atlA = ~t + 4at /A ~ --a + --A 8. 4 3 t 2 
~ 
6 jl + 4a2/A ~ 1 - --a IA 4 . 2 
Atki. i~1.2. we find that P~=O and hence. E(IT(ki.kj»=O. Also. 
for ki=k j • ~~ E(IT(ki,kj»=O. The final thing to demonstrate is 
that if ki=k j • then Pi~O ~ k i ~ ki. From (8). note that Pi can 
only become negative if k>a2 . Rewrite (8) as: 
As both sides are assumed positive. we can square these without 
reversing the inequality sign. Squaring and rearranging we get: 
2 o ~ (2-k - a) - 2-A-k i 2 i 
Now by assumption. 2-ki~a2. Hence the first term is always 
positive. implying that for positive prices we require ki~ki. 
From this we get that restricting attention to non-negative 
prices. capacities must lie in the range [O.ki]' i=I.2. As 
E(U(ki.k j » attain its local maximun in the interior of this 
* set and its local minimum on the upper bound of the set. k i is 
* * the global maximum on the set [O.ki]. Finally E(IT(ki.k j » = 
1 2 > 0 p* g-a t . so i is a global maximum. 
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Case {b}: Firm j act as if it will have the low capacity while 
firm i acts as if it wants to have the high capacity. We get 
the following set of first order conditions: 
(21) 
The solution to this is: 
k i 
1 2 
= --a + ---11 3 I! 3 
k j 
1 1 
= 3'- a l! + --11 6 
which is a local maximum and 
i=I.2 
which is a local minimum. 
Case-(c). where firm i acts as if it chooses the low capacity 
and- firm j the high follow by symmetry of the problem. 
Case Cd}: Both act (inconsistently) as if they choose the low 
capacity. i.e. both maximise (15). First order conditions are: 
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i=I,2 
The local maximum is: 
i=I,2 
_ whereas the local minimum is as for the other cases. 
The results are summarised in table 1. below. 
Table 1. 
case a b c d 
1 1 I" 2 1 1 1 [ j 2 21] k i _ea +-eA "3 eal+3'e A -ea +-eA 15 A+4al + al+SalA+A 3 l 2 3 l 6 
1 [ j"2 21) 1 1 1 1 1 2" 
·k _ea +_e A -·a "+_eA -·a +-·A 15 A+4al + al+SalA+A j 3 l 2 3 l 6 3 l 3 
[~.al+~eA ]3 ]3 
ITi 
1 2 (lea +le A)2 
~e [4a l +A+j a l +Sal A+A2 ge a l 3 l 6 1 2 153 
al+A+j a~+SalA+A2 _ea +_eA 3 l 3 
[teal+~eA ]3 ]3 
IT j 
1 2 (lea +le A)2 
~e [4a l +A+j a l +Sal A+A2 ge a l 1 2 3 l 6 153 
al+A+j a~+SalA+A2 _ea + .... e A 3 l3 
The three equilibria, case a, band c correspond to points a, b 
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and c in figure 2. Case d is not an equilibrium but included 
for completeness. 
One can readily show the following lemma: 
Lemma 2.: 
2. 2 ~ 0 IT i Ib > ITila > ITil c 
4a -6a A-A => I! I! 
2 2 ~ 0 IT i Ib > ITilc > ITil a 
4a -6a A-A => I! I! 
Proof. : 
Compare the relevant entries in table 1. 
Let the range A be a proxy for the variance of a. ( Var(a)= 
1 2 I2eA . Then if the variance is ,sufficinetly large relative to 
al!' both firms would prefer tthe asymmetric outcome over the 
symmetric outcome. As in either of the two cases. both firms 
[] 
prefer to be the igh capacity firm. there is no good basis for 
selecting a p~rticular equilibrium as the most likely outcome. 
The appealing feature of the symmetric equilibrium is that ex 
ante identical firms producing a homogeneous good get the same 
payoff in equilibrium. On the other hand it leads to some 
degree of indeter~inacy as to who sets the high price in the 
final stage. 
In the asymmetric eqUilibria. on the other hand. there is no 
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doubth as to who sets the high price. Also note that the 
average profit in the asymmetric equilibria exceeds that in the 
symmetric: 
1 2 
-·a 9 ~ 
Hence if we allowed side payments, one of the asymmetric 
outcomes could be implemented as an equilibrium. 
It should, though. be pointed out that the model rests on 
strong and at times special assumptions. Hence the results 
should be interpreted with care. 
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4. Asymmetric information. 
In this section we consider a simple extension of our model to 
the case of asymmetric information. This case could signify one 
in which the worse informed i~ either an entrant or has been in 
the industry for a shorter period than the other. Without loss 
of generality, assume that firm 1 ha~ access to the better 
information. 
As noted in section 3.3, it is difficult to solve the capacity 
stage because the first-order conditions are non-linear. When 
considering asymmetric information these problems are 
exacerbated for two reasons. Firstly, it increases the number 
of non-linear equations which must be solved simultaneously 
making an analytical solution hard to obtain. This leaves one 
with the choice of either cooking up some very special examples 
as in section 4.1 below, or use numerical methods as in section 
4.2 and 4.3 below. The second problem which arise is that when 
firm 1 has the better information, this information will be 
reflected in its capacity choice. Thus k1 may fully or 
partially reveal the information of firm 1 to firm 2. Firm 1 
then has an incentive to either hide its information, or to try 
and influence the inference drawn by firm 2 by biasing its 
choice ofkl .' Such models of strategic information transmission 
are hard to solve, involving at best first order differential 
equations. For a solution of a simple leader follower model 
with private information, see Gal-Or(1987). In view of the 
difficultien of solving the model in the first place, we shall 
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in the following assume that firm 1 does not attempt to bias 
its capacity choice and hence that k1 fully reveal the 
information of firm 1. 
In section 4.1 we consider avery special case which has an 
analytical solution. In section 4.2 and 4.3 we consider some 
numerical examples. 
4.1 an analytical example. 
We first work through an example with an analytical solution. 
Assume that firm 1 will be informed whether a is in the upper 
,. 
two-thirds or lower third of its support. i.e. a € [ae.a] or a 
,. ,. 1 
€ [a.au ]' where a = ae + 3·A. Firm 2 knows a € [ae.au ]. This 
information structure is common knowledge. 
Firm 2 knows that firm 1 will have the better information and 
thus knows that its capacity in some cases will be too low. in 
some cases too high. Specifically it realises that if: 
Further in the second stage (because we assumed that k1 fully 
revealed the "information of firm 1). firm 2 will be able to 
infer the information of firm 1. Thus stage 2 is solved as in 
section 3.1. Given this firm 2 maximises the following in the 
first stage: 
(22) 
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i. h Where k1 and k1 is the capacity of 
h high respectively and E(U2 (-» and 
firm 1 when a is low and 
E(U~( -»' are given by (10) 
and (15) respectively. Firm 1 maximises either: 
E(Uf) max E(U 1) = if a € 
kl 
1 
E(U~} max E{U 1) = if a € 
kh 
1 
The first order conditions are: 
l l 8E(11 1 (k1 ' k 2» 0 
8kl 
= 
" 1 a€[al,a] 
h h 8E(111 (k 1 , k 2» 0 
8kh 
= 
". 
1 <x€[a,a ] 
u 
" [al,a] 
" [a,a
u
] , 
" a€[a,a ] 
u 
(23) 
(24) 
= 0 (25) 
(26) 
(27) 
One possible solution is one in which both terms in (25) are· 
zero. Denote the two terms (25a) and (25b) respectively. This 
case is particularly simple because we can solve (25a) and (26) 
seperately form (25b) and (27) so long as we ensure that the 
same k2 solves both sets of equations. We can find the 
equilibrium capacities and profits by using column band c in 
table 1 with a l and A sUitably redefined
4 ). The capacities and 
ex ante expected profits are: 
-13S-
1 1 
,.. 
3'·ai + -·A for a € [ai·a] IS 
kl = 
1 5 A 
-·a + -·A for a € [a.a ] 3 i 9 u 
k2 
1 2 for 
€. [a i • au] = 3'·ai + -·A a 9 
3 
E(rr~) (2S) 
1 2 3 3"·ai + -·A 9 
1 5 
_ea + _ell 3 /! 9 
(29) 
If both firms had access to the better information we are back 
in the case considered in section 3. where payoffs are given in 
table 1. Depending on which of the three possible equilibria 
are expected to prevail. we get the following ex ante expected 
profits. 5 ) 
The symmetric case (s): 
+ !.A)2 
9· 
The asymmetric case where firmh is the high capacity firm. 
firm/! the low capacity firm: 
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1 1 3 1 2' 3 
_ea + _eA 
2 3 ea .e + 
_eA 
E(ll~) 1 3 .e IS 9 = _e + _e 5 3 1 2 3 1 
_ea + _eA 3'ea .e + -eA 3 .e 9 9 
Finally, if neither had any information we get 
The symmetric case: 
E(IlU} 1 2 = geal! s 
E(ll~) = (!.e a + 3 I! 1 ]2 SeA 
1 1 3 
-ea + _eA 
E(rr~) 3 I! 6 = 1 2 
_ea + _eA 3 .e 3 
Comparing the different profit levels, we can show the 
following ranking: 
The symmetric case: 
E(ll~) > E(ll!) > E(ll~) > E(ll:) 
Theasymmatric case: 
(i) E(ll~} > E{ll~} > E{ll~} 
{ii} 
(iii) . 
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In both the symmetric and the asymmetric case, information has 
a value for both firms, i.e. E(Ua ) > E(Uu). Whether or not the 
informed has an incentive to pass on his information or the 
uninformed want to obtain it depends on which of the three 
equilibria will arise in the ~ase where both have the same 
information. In the symmetric case the informed do not want to 
disseminate information whereas the uninformed want to obtain 
it. In the asymmetric case where the best informed also become 
the high capacity setter following the information 
dissemination, the informed is willing to share his 
information, even if restricted to truth-telling. The 
uninformed on the other hand does not want this information 
(see (iii) above). In the asymmetric case where the best 
informed become the low capacity firm following information 
dissemination, this is reversed. 
4.2 NumeTical examples. 
We want to get an idea of what happens if we change the 
information set of firm 1 by partitioning the set [ae,a
u
]. Let 
n be the number of partitions of [ae,a
u
] of equal length. Thus 
contrary to section 4.1 above we consider symmetric partitions 
which in itself may change the previous results, i.e the. 
results may depend on the partitions used. The numerical 
results are given in table 2 below. The capacities and profits 
are averages. 
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Table 2. 
Cour- No No No No 
not Sharing Sharing Sharing Sharing Sharing Sharing 
a,e a, n output kl k2 k i ITI IT2 ITi u 
30 31 1 10.2 10.500 10.500 10.50 100.00 100.00 100.0 
2 10.300 10.291 10.33 102.13 102.12 101.1 
3 10.259 10.259 10.28 102.45 102.43 102.2 
4 10.229 10.229 10.25 102.15 102.13 102.5 
5 10.220 10.220 10.23 102.84 102;83 102.1 
6 10.208 10.209 10.22 102.96 102.94 102.8 
1 10.204 10.204 10.21 103.00 102.98 102.9 
30 33 1 10.5 11.500 11.500 11.50 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2 10.873 10.861 11.00 106.7 106.5 105.1 
3 10.780 10.719 10.83 107.6 101.4 106.5 
4 10.688 10.690 10.15 108.5. 108.3 101.7 
5 10.661 10.663 10.70 108.8 108.6 108.2 
6 10.626 10.628 10.66 ·109.1 109.0 108.6 
7 10.613 10.615 10.64 109.3 109.1 108.8 
30 36 1 11.0 13.000 13.000 13.00 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2 11.740 11.120 12.00 114.2 113.6 110.5 
3 11.562 11.560 11.66 115.9 115.3 114.1 
4 11.376 11.380 11.50 111.8 117.2 115.8 
5 11.323 11.333 11.40 118.3 111.1 111.0 
6 11.251 11. 260 11.33 119.0 118.4 . 111.1 
7 11.227 11. 231 11.28 119.2 118.6 118.2 
Column 1 and 10 gives the symmetric solution when both firms 
have access to the better information. 6) The most remarkable 
result of our numerical examples is that neither firm prefer to 
share the information of firm 1. In these examples this is 
caused by the fact that due to uncertainty the worse informed 
(firm 2) choose an average capacity which is lower than under 
information sharing. This allows the better informed (firm I) 
also to choose a lower capacity, leading to lower total output 
and higher profit for both firms. 
Secondly from the tabel it seems as if output and profit 
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converge to the Cournot level as firm 1 moves towards perfect 
information. We can easily show that this is the case when both 
firms share the information. Let n be the number of partitions 
of [ae.au ] of equal length. Then as n ~ 00 firms become 
perfectlY informed about a. Define 6=A/n. and let U be the 
.n 
profit of a firm when the number of partitions is n. For the 
three equilibria. this can be written as 
Case a: 
n-l 
= !.!. l {ae+i.6)2 = 
i=O 
Case b: 
n-l U: = !.~. l {ae+i.6+!.6)2 
i=O 
= !. ({a .+!.!)2 + n-l. A.{a +!.!) + (n-l}(2.n-1 L A2) ." 9 e 6 n n e6 n 6 2 
·n 
Case c: 
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n-1 
= b-*- 2 [(a~+io+20)2 
i=O 
_ ~-(a +2-!) + n-1_ A + ~_A2] _ 2n ~ n n 2 2 
n 
(30) 
Note that for i=O.l •... 
n-1 r!1 3 
lim !- \ ~ = O. Hence the linit of the last term in (30) n~ n L A i=Oa~+2-n 
is zero. and we find: . 
If both firms had perfect information prior to choosing 
capacity. expected profit of firm i would be: 
a 2 2 u 2 i-I 1 a +a u-a~+a~ 1 [2 + ~_A2] E(ll) a u = --da = -- = -- a + a - A 9 9 3 9 ~ ~ 
a~ 
= A}JB ITa = A}JB nb = A}JB fIc n n n· 
So all three equilibria converge to the perfect information 
equilibrium. 
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It is difficult to show convergence for the case of asymmetric 
information.It involves finding what the solution to a system 
of n+1 non-linear equations converges to as n~. We can look at 
the limit at which one firm. firm 1. has perfect information 
the other. firm 2. no information. In this case the reaction 
function of the informed become 
(25) 
The first order condition of the uninformed can be written as: 
a - k1 (a) 
2 )·da = 0 (26) 
The solution to (25) and (26) is 
= lli:l 3 
The equilibrium price and profits are: 1 } 
a 1 
p = 2' - <rE(a); 1 2 = g.E(a) 
If both had access to full information profits would be: 
E(fI) !.E(a}2 + !·a2 i· = 9· 9 a i=1.2 
So in the limit. firm 2 value the information of firm 1. but 
firm 1 prefers not to share its information with firm 2. 
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4.3 Another example. 
We consider an example where both firms have access to private 
information. Assume that firm 1 knows whether a is in the lower 
third or the upper two-thirds and that firm 2 knows whether a 
is in the lower two-thirds or the upper third. We can 
illustrate this in a diagram: 
Fi rm 1: 
Firm 2: 
figure 3. 
a 
u 
Now there are three possible cases: a € a 1 = [a l ,a1], 
a € b 1 n a 2 = [a 1 ,a2 ], and a € b 2 ~ [a2 ,au ]' 
Case 1: Firm 1 knows that firm 2 has observed a € b 1 . Hence it 
knows that it will get the lower capacity regardless and hence 
maximise (15). Firm 2 believes with probability 1/2 that firm 1 
has observed a € a 1 and with probability 1/2 a € a 2 . In the 
former case it will have the higher capacity and maximises (10) 
in the latter it will have the lower capacity and maximises 
(15). Thus firm 2's problem is: 
m~x 
2 
Case 2: Firm 1 believes with probability 1/2 that firm 2 has 
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observed a € b 1 with probability 1/2 a € b 2 " Firm 2 believes 
with probability 1/2 that firm 1 has observed a € a 1 with 
probability 1/2 a € a 2 " The respective problems are.then: 
Case 3: Firm 2 knows that firm 1 has observed a € a 2 " Firm 1 
believes with probability 1/2 that firm 2 has observed a € b 1 
with probability 1/2 a € b 2 " The problem of firm 1 is then: 
We get the following numerical results. shown in table 3 below~ 
where kl and k2 is capacity of firm 1 and 2 respectively when 
neither firm share the information. and k i is the capacity of 
firm i when both firm share their information" 
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Table 3. 
case 1 case 2 case 3 A priori 
(ae,au ) cap a€[ae ,a l ] a€[a l ,a2 ] a€[a2 ,au ] expected 
(30,36) kl 10.21 12.31 11.38 11.34 
k2 11. 51 10.59 12.81 11.64 
k i 11.00 11.61 12.33 11.61 
(30,33) kl 10.12 11. 21 10.68 10.69 
k2 10.18 10.21 11.41 10.82 
k i 10.50 10.83 11.11 10.83 
(33,36) kl 11.11 12.21 11.68 11.67 
k2 11.19 11.21 12.41 11.83 
k i 11.50 11.83 12.11 11.83 
So firm 2 has higher a priori expected capacity, but capacity 
below the information-sharing capacity. Both firms are above 
expected Cournot capacity. 
Corresponding profits are shown in table 4 below, where ITi is 
the profit of firm i if both shared the information. 
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Table 4. 
case 1 case 2 case 3 A priori 
(a~.au) cap a€[a~.a1] a€[a 1 ·a2 ] a€[a2 ·au ] expected 
(30.36) III 95.87 125.55 123.89 115. 10 
Il2 107.46 107.48 139.52 118.15 
Il. 
1 
100.00 113.78 128.44 114.07 
(30.33) III 97.43 112.62 111.40 107. 15 
1I2 103.87 103.21 119.05 108.71 
IIi 100.00 106.78 113.78 106.85 
{33.36} III 118.11 134.87 133.49 128.82 
Il2 125.29 124.47 141.88 130.55 
Il i 121.00 128.44 136.11 128.52 
From the numerical examples. there are no signs of firms 
wanting to share information. 
Our examples suggest some tentative conclusions. Firstly. when 
information is imparted involuntarily through plans or acts. 
there seems little scope for voluntary information 
transmission. In the examples. firms choose their capacity in 
greater ignorance than when they choose prices. It seems to be 
the case that the added uncertainty implies a bias towards 
lower capacity. which helps to keep prices high. The reduced 
uncertainty in the pricing stage helps firms choose a "better" 
price. Thus firms -in a sense prefer greater uncertainty in the 
first stage coupled with less uncertainty in the second stage. 
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Secondly. information need not have a positive value for the 
worse informed. This result is caused by ignorance in the first 
stage being potentially profitable because it biases total 
capacity downwards. This implies that there need not be 
anything which drives a firm to obtain more information prior 
, 
to the planning stage. 
Again caution is necessary in interpreting the results of the 
examples. They do not necessarily generalise. and it seems very 
likely that the results hinges on the functional forms choosen. 
as well as the information partitions considered. 
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5. concluding remarks. 
In this paper we have shown that under uncertainty, firms will 
not set the same price and hence the analogy with the Cournot 
outcome no longer hold. The high capacity firm is shown to set 
the high price and earn the higher profit. In the capacity 
stage 3 equilibria was found, one symmetric, and two asymmetric 
(differing only in the labelling of firms). Thus the subgame 
perfect equilibrium may involve ex ante identical firms 
producing a homogeneous good having both different capacities 
and different prices.Further it is shown that firms install 
larger capacity under uncertainty that they would have done had 
the mean of the random variable been known to occur with 
certainty. 
Secondly private asymmetric information was considered. We 
showed that there did not seem any incentives for information 
sharing between firms. Further numerical examples indicate that 
there may be cases where both firms would prefer to be ignorant 
when choosing capacity and informed when choosing prices. This 
question is left for future research. For future research it 
would also be of interest to consider other information 
structures. 
Another result which should be noted is that market share 
measured as a fraction of total industry output supplied is a 
random variable, because the sales of the high price firm is 
random whereas the sales of the low price firm is 
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deterministic. This also implies that the two market shares 
need not follow the same distribution. Now this problem is 
likely to generalise to a n-firm model. where some firms will 
always be at their capacity limit whereas others will act as 
buffers. Thi~ has consequences for the choice of estimation 
technique if market share is used as an explanatory variable in 
an econometric model. because not only would the explanatory 
variable be stochastic. but the error term need not be 
identically distributed. This cast severe doubt on e.g. 
ordinary least squares as the best estimator. and gives further 
reasons for extensive testing of the assumptions underlying the 
estimation technique. 
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Footnotes: 
1) An alternative rule often called reservation price rationing 
originates from Edgeworth(1925). Independent of whether 
consumers are homogeneous or heterogeneous, a random selection 
is allowed to purchase their entire demand. This is a kind of 
first come first served rule where the place in the queue is 
allotted randomly. Note is that parallel rationing is much 
simpler to work with because the residual demand of firm i 
depends on the price of firm j in a very trivial manner, as it 
only affects the point of discontinuity of the demand function. 
2) This equilibrium concept is related to the one used in Eaton 
and Kierzkowski(1984) who assume: 
"Each firm takes the other firm's price as given when 
contemplating price reduct tons. In considering price 
increases, however, each firm takes into account the 
incentives it may create for the other form to lower its 
price. In equilibrium each firm will charge the highest 
price it can without provoking a price cut by the other 
firm.H(pp. 102, their italiCS). 
3) Although Stackelberg(1934) (not surpricingly) did not use 
game theoretic arguments. he was well aware of the difficulties 
in attaining an equilibrium where en endogeneous leader exist. 
For a much later exposition in English. see Gal-Or(1986) or 
Dowrick(1986). It is worth mentioning that Stackelberg(1934) 
has not been translated into english. The book by Stackelberg 
which has been translated into english. Stackelberg(1952}, is a 
textbook containing only a brief outline of the analysis of 
duopoly carried out in Stackelberg(1934) and not 
Stackelberg(1934) as some seems to believe. 
4) Solving (25a) and (26) use a 2=a2 and A=A/3. Solving (25b) 
and (27) use a 2=a2+A/3 and A=2·A/3. 
~ 
5} The profits are found as follows. For a€[a2 ,a] set a 2 =a2 and 
~ 
A=A/3 in table 1. For a€[a,a
u
] set a 2=a2+A/3 and A=2·A/3 in 
table 1. Finally weight the two expressions by 1/3 and 2/3 
respectively. 
6} If the informed firm was certain that the outcome would be 
the asymmetric outcome in which it has the high capacity. it 
would prefer to submit its information to the uninformed even 
it had to do so truthfully. On the other hand, if it had the 
lower capacity. no such incentives exist for the informed firm. 
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Appendix V.A. 
From (15) we know that given kl > k 2 • u~ 
With linear capacity costs this still holds because: 
uhp Hlp 
k 1-k2 (H~P - bkl ) > 0 1 2 = kl 
Uhp _ Ulp 
k 2-k1 (U~p - bk2 ) < 0 2 I = k2 
Using (15) we can write: 
= -
Note that (AI) is independent of capacity costs. 
Define A = a - a Now u I!. 
At A=O. we have r = O. Also: 
for A ~ 0 
(AI) 
(A2) 
Also 
--+ 
(a2-k).{k i -k j ) 
18 
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for ! --+ 0 
Hence r must be positive for A~O, because if r was negative 
then (A2) would surely be positive, but then profits is an 
increasing function of ! over its range and positive at !=O, a 
contradiction. 
This implies that rr~ > rr: and from (AI) we have rr~ < rr~. 
Finally 
But from above we know that r > O. Then the inequality follGws. 
Finally ki=k j follows from (15). Q.E.D. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The use of conjectural variations in the analysis of quantity-setting 
oligopoly is widespread. The reason is that differing conjectures permit 
a continuum of equilibria, ranging from an apparent Bertrand competitive 
equilibrium, general negative conjectural equilibria and then through Cournot 
zero conjectures to positive conjectures and apparent collusion. However, 
two questions of general relevance to oligopoly theory are particularly 
appropriate to conjectural variations models. First, what is th~ benefit 
of being able to catalogue a large array of different equilibria relating to 
differing conjectural variations if there is no way of selecting the 
particular equilibrium that is appropriate in a specific case? Is it not 
possible to restrict the set of possible conjectures? Although some progress 
has been made in making the choice of game strategy endogenous in sequential-
game models (see Ka1ai and Stanford, 1985), there appears that little has 
been achieved to date in terms of a one-stage game. l ! 
The second and related question concerns the rationality or consistency 
2/ 
of conjectural variations. A number of papers beginning with Bresnahan (1981) 
have argued that only consistent conjectures are valid. Thus an equilibrium, 
based on a firm's belief that competitors will increase their outputs in 
response to an increase in its output, cannot be sustained if a different 
response (for instance a reduction in competitors' outputs) 'would occur if 
the firm experimented by increasing its output from the supposed equilibrium 
position. If all inconsistent conjectural equilibria are dismissed as invalid, 
then in the simplest (linear demand, homogeneous product, constant marginal 
cost) case, only competitive equilibria are consistent (e.g •. Perry, 1982, 
Proposition 1). If each firm expects that others will "make room" for any 
-157-
increased output it chooses to produce, then a competitive industry supply 
level will be achieved and price will remain equal to marginal cost, 
irrespective of an individual firm's changes in output. 
One might reject the argument that consistency is a necessary or 
even desirable property for a conjectural variations equilibrium. 31 
Experimentation to test consistency may appear difficult to carry out without 
one firm's experiments interfering with those of another. Also, one might 
argue that the basis for the conjectures lies outside the sjmple model and 
that their justification is in terms of these exogenous considerations. It 
would appear that one has to make such arguments in order to allow other 
conjectures than the competitive conjecture to be of any interest. However, 
to dismiss the property of consistency as a requirement loses the very real 
possibility of determining conjectural variations endogenously and thus 
being able to focus on one or.more equilibria of interest f.rom the set of 
conjectural variations equilibria. A more intriguing prospect is to enlarge 
the conjectural variations model so as to allow any specific conjecture to 
be consistent in particular (but not general) circumstances. In this paper 
we will take this alternative route and outline a model where demand uncertainty 
permits a quantity strategy to be interpreted both in the usual terms of an 
output plan and additionally as a signal relating to demand. conditions. By 
making this extension of the basic model it will be possible to restrict the 
number of consistent conjectures to just two. One will again be the competitive 
conjecture, but the other may be from anywhere in the complete range of 
possible conjectures depending only on the parameters relating to information 
transmission. 
The general argument of the model can be put very simply. Suppose 
firm i announces an increase in its output. In a market with no uncertainty, 
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other firms would simply see the remaining market as smaller and cut back 
their planned outputs. However, if firms are uncertain about the strength 
of market demand they will be heartened by firm . its apparent confidence 
in the market. They will revise their expectations in an optimistic 
direction, and this revision will have a counteracting effect on supply plans. 
Thus even a positive conjecture may be consistent if the increase in optimism 
is sufficiently large. 
The following timing of events is envisaged. 
(i) Firms obtain their private information and use this to decide on an 
output plan which is then communicated (voluntarily or involuntarily) to 
all other firms. 
(ii) Since firms cannot hide their output plans from each other, a firm's 
plan gives an (imperfect) clue as to its own private market information 
to its competitors. 
(iii) Each firm can now extract information about the level of demand from 
the output p'lans of others and can add this to its own private information. 
(iv) In the light of all the firm's information, its output plan is 
revised and announced, given a conjecture concerning the reaction of its 
competitors to both the market preemption and market information aspects 
of the plan. This conjecture is consistent with the firm's own reaction 
function. 
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(v) Given their augmented information and conjectures, the revised 
output plans could be an industry equilibrium. That is individual firms 
may predict the outcome of the Nash game in outputs. 
(vi) Plans are implemented only when all firms are in equilibrium, and 
actual outputs comply with firms' last announced plans. This latter 
assumption effectively prevents firms from pretending one plan while 
executing another. 
(vii) Since the last plan announced by the firm will be carried out, 
only this plan has any actual effect on other firms' behaviour. There is 
no point in a firm attempting to mislead others by announcing an initial 
plan, the information content of whi~~is to be contradicted by later plans. 
If the plan is revised in a way which changes the character of the 
information contained in it, other firms will forget the old information, and 
.incor·porate the new information in their market expectations and output plans. 
The fact that firms output plans become full commitments to production 
is an important simplification. 41 Without this property, firms would trad~ 
off the cost of deviating from such plans with the benefits of fake 
representation of information and intentions. Such behaviour is the subject 
of further research. However, it is interesting to consider the information 
transmission mechanism in a mogel when final plans are implemented in order 
to ,ssess the impact of the quality of information transmission on equilibrium 
behaviour. It is still possible for firms to choose final output plans 
which understate·. market demand: the constraint on them is that they actually 
have to be bound by such plans. The full commitment to the final plan may 
arise due to the public nature of firms' contracts with input suppliers or 
to industrial espionage. It may also reflect plans as responses to surve~ 
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by manufacturers' associations; in this case firms may wish to retain 
future credibility by responding their true current intentions. Examples 
of such surveys are widespread although they mostly relate to trends in 
. 5/ h business confidence and other qualitative factors. Our analysis ere 
yields the possibility of an interesting motivation for such indicative 
planning mechanisms: to increase the coordination of industry supply and 
thus the apparent collusion of suppliers. 
In Section II, a simple model with quality-setting firms is 
augmented to incorporate cost and.dema~d uncertainty and information 
transmission via output plans. The set of consistent conjectures is 
derived. Section III categorises the conjectural equilibria in a series 
of propositions. It is shown that there exist underlying parameters of 
the model such that any conjectural response between competition and full 
apparent collusion ~an be consistent. Some comparative static analysis 
is reported. It is also shown that a continuous adjustment process of 
·output plans is stable so that the conjectural equilibrium would be 
achieved whatever initial output plans were assumed. Section IV summarises 
conclusions and reviews the assumptions of the analysis. Some suggestions 
for further research are incorporated. 
-161-
II. CONSISTENT CONJECTURES IN AN EQUILIBRIUM WITH INFORMATION 
TRANSMISSION 
We will only consider an n-firm symmetric case with a linear market 
demand for a homogeneous product: 
p = a' - Q (1) 
where p is product price and Q is market supply. The intercept a.' 
is a random variable, normally distributed N(~' , a 2) Variable costs 
a 
of production for the i th firm are 
C.(q.) = (in + 11.)q. 
1 1 1 1 
where qi 
distribute(i 
th . is the i firm's output and l1i is a random variable, normally 
N(Q, a 2) The variance of 
11 
is invariant across firms 
in order that firms are ex ante identical. The 11.'S are assumed 
1 
uncorrelated across firms so that above expected costs in one firm does not 
implya'bove or below e~pected costs in any other. To simplify notation 
define a = a' - m E(a) =~, - m = a , so that - 2 a - N(a, a ) 
a 
We shall assume that each firm receives perfect information (a perfect 
signal) concerning its own cost (11.) prior to choosing a strategy, but no 
1 
direct information. concerning the other firms' costs. Each firm also receives 
an imperfect signal Si on the realisation of a prior to choosing a 
strategy. The signal is assumed of the form 
(2) 
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where E. is normally distributed N(O, 0 2) 
1 E 
and E(E., E.) = 0 
1 J 
Vi,j i f: j Further it is assumed that a , '1 i and E. 1 are uncorrelated. 
Our model is one of differential information, i.e. no firm believes 
that any firm has superior or inferior information to any other. Given all 
this we can summarise what is assumed common knowledge for all firms. 
a - N(~, o 2) 
a 
Vi 
1')i - N(O, o 2) Vi' 
'1 
e: • - N(O, 0 2 ) Vi 
1 E (3) 
E(a, '1 i ) = E(a, e:. ) 1 = 0 Vi 
E(e:. , '1 j ) = 0 Vi, j 1 
E(E i , E j) = E( '1 i ' T1j) = 0 Vi, j i f: j 
In the absence of any other information, firm i would use (2) to 
predict the realisation of a, E(aIS.) Given the prior on a and the 
1 
normality assumptions. 6/ E(aISi ) is the convex combination of Si and 
a. 
(4) 
where (5) 
It would then choose its output qi to maximise expected profits, given 
'1 i · and Si 
max E(lliISi' '1 i ) = max [(t Si + (l-t)~ - '1i - Q).qi] 
qi qi 
(6) 
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Now consider that firm i has a complete conjecture concerning the 
rest of the industry's behaviour. Let this be of the form 
where Q_ i is the output of all the other firms in the industry and S' . -1 
is the "aggregate" signals on which the other firms base their choice of 
strategies. The form of (7) reflects the fact that if firm i observes 
Q. it would be able to infer additional information on ~ 
-1 
Due to the structure of the model, the first-order condition for 
firm j must be linear in S. and l1j Hence Q • must be linear in J -1 
all S. , l1j , j :{:: i The signal on a. obtained from Q • can thus be J -1 
written as 
S' 1 L (S. - k11.) = 1 L (&j - kl1.) = -- a. + --
-i n-l j:{::i J J n-l j:{::i J 
1 L S' = a. + e (8) = --n-l j;'i J i 
where S' = Sj - k11 j , e. = (L (&j - k11 j »/(n - 1) j 1 j:{::i 
and k is a parameter which reflects the relative importance of Sj and 
llj on other firms' outputs. Observing Q_ i only partially reveals the 
information held on a. by the other (n-1) firms (the Sj ) due to the 
"noise" arising from random cost (11 j ) ; only the S' j are inferred. 
If firms have to announce their output plans prior to carrying them out, 
then Q_ i is available to the ith firm. From its conjectural function (7), 
S~i can be inferred. Thus any candidate for an equilibrium set of output 
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plans ql' q2 •••• qn must incorporate the information contained in 
S ' S' S' respectl.·vely Each fl.·rm 1.' has two signals • 
. , -2' ... , . 
-l. . -n 
and S' 
-i to use for predicting the demand parameter a. 
S. l. 
Firm i's information on a. given in (2) and (8) can be summarised. 
see Jaffe and Winkler (1976, p 50, 57-58). as 
Si = oS. + (1-0) S', l. -l. (9) 
(10) 
where 
VAR(e.) 
o = l. VAR(E.) + VAR (e.) l. l. = 
(11) 
and 
(4') 
where (5') 
Replacing Si by Si • the problem of firm i given in (6) can be rewritten 
as 
max E(niIS i • ni ) = max [(tS i + (1-t)~ - ni - Q)qi) 
qi qi 
(12) 
where (6) is now the special case in which 6 = 1 • i.e. the case where 
either 2 a .. a 
£ 
in which case Si contains sufficient information on a. or 
2 an .. 00 in which case S~i is an infinitely noisy signal· and thus has no value. 
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Writing Q = Q . + q. ,the first order condition for maximising 
-1 1 
(12) with respect to qi given t~e conjectural function (7), the combined 
signal (9), and ~i is 
= t6S. + t(1-6)S'. + (l-t)~ - Q_ i" - D. - (2 + c)q. = 0 1 -1 1 1 
Substituting fom (7) into (13) and solving for qi in terms of 
(13) 
S. 
1 
~i Q_ i and a yields the reaction function, incorporating reaction to 
information as 
~here 
and 
qi = u + v(S. - (Jv)-l~.) + wQ i 
11-
u = {(l-t)~ - at(1-6)/b}/J 
v = t6/J 
w = {t(1-6)/b - l}/J 
J = 2 + c + ct(l-6)/b 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
A reaction function of the form (14) holds for any ith firm. We must now 
investigate the joint response of all other firms, given their reaction 
functions· (14), to an increase in one firm's output. Following Perry (1982) 
we not only take into account the direct effects but also the interaction among 
all the other firms (if firms i and j react to a change in the output of 
firm 1, then they also react to each other's reaction). Let the firm increasing 
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its output be firm 1. For i ~'l we can write (14) as 
-1 qi - wQ_i, 1 = u + v(Si - (Jv) ni ) + wqi i = 2, .•. ,n (19) 
where Q- i1 is the sum of outputs of all but the ith and first firms. 
Summing (19) over i from 2 to n yields 
n -1 Q_ l - (n-2)wQ_1 = (n-l)u + v E (Si - (Jv) ni ) + (n-l)wql (20) i=2 
and we can write 
and more generally 
where 
and 
-1 k = (Jv) 
a = (n-l)u/M 
b - (n-l)v/M 
c = (n-1)w/M 
M = 1-(n-2)w 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
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We have thus obtained a response function of the form of the conjectured 
response function (7). If the (a,b,c) defined as functions of (u,v,w) 
by equation (23), (24) and (25) are the same as those defining (u,v,w) in 
equations (15), (16) and (17), then a consistent conjectural variations 
equilibrium has been identified. 
Note that a unique value of k greater than one exists to solve 
(22). since Thus is 
decreasing in 0 But, from (11) , 0 is increasing in k for k ~ 0 
Thus {Jv)-l is decreasing in k Further (Jv)-l > 1 when k = 1 and 
is bounded at 1 + 0 2/02 
E a. as k -+00 Therefore (22) has a unique positive 
solution and we will simply denote this as k 
It remains to solve the six equations (15), (16), (17), (23), (24) and 
(25) for the six parameters a, b, c, u, v, w, in terms of the underlying 
parameters n, and a. 
Taking the ratio of (16) to (17) and equating it to the ratio of 
(22) to (23) yields 
to b v ~~~----- = - = -t(l-o) _ 1 c w 
b 
(27) 
Using the first part of (27) to obtain b in terms of c yields 
b = t(1-o) - toc (28) 
Substitution of (28) into (17) permits w to be expressed as a function of c 
W - oc/«2+c)(1-o-oc) + c{l-o» (29) 
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Then substitution of (29) into (25) and (26) yields a quadratic equation in c 
oc2 - c(2-(n+2)6) - (2-(n+l)6) = 0 (30) 
The two roots of (30) represent conjectural coefficients which are consistent. 
The roots are: 
'* (i) c = c = (2-(n+l)o)/o 
(ii) c = -1 
In each case, substituting back into (29), (28) and (27) yields associated 
unique values for w, b and v respectively. Then taking the ratio of 
(15) to (16) and of (23) to (24) yields 
~ - ~ = {(l-t)~ - a (l-o)t}/to b - v b (31) 
Given b a and u can be solved uniquely from (31). Thus in each case 
defined by the two roots of equation (30) there exists a unique set of 
parameters (a, b, c, u, v, w) which yields a consistent conjectural 
equilibrium. Inserting the parameters as coefficients in (14) and (22) 
respectively yields: 
Case (1) 
'Ie 
C = (2-(n+l)o)/6 
-1 -. -qi = G [(on-l)OCL + (ori-l)Ot(Si - CL) + (2-(n+l)CL)Q_i] (32) 
(33) 
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where G = (n-1)o + (n-2)(2-(n+1)o) 
Case (ii) 
c = -1 
= a + t(S! - a) - Q qi 1 -i (34) 
(35) 
In the next section, each of the two cases are analysed in turn by 
considering the properties of the conjectural parameter and the implied 
equilibrium. 
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III. RESULTS 
The two consistent conjectural variations identified in Section 2 
lead to distinct industry equilibria. We define an equilibrium as follows: 
Definition 
An n-tuple (ql' ••• , qn) is an equilibrium if, given information (5 i , ni ) 
no firm i wishes to change , where 
(a, b, c) form a consistent conjecture. 
s' 
-i and 
It is worth repeating that although the present model is a non-
cooperative game, communications take place. Firms are assumed to announce 
their plans and it is from these that information is obtained about Q_ i and 
hence s' . 
-1 
It is assumed that no production can take place without a prior 
announcement so that any equilibrium is based on full information concerning 
competitors' supply plans. 
The number. n represents the number of firms in the industry, 
announcing plans and providing information, but not necessarily the number 
with positive outputs in an equilibrium, since firms are heterogeneous after 
receiving their signals and some may prefer to supply zero to the market. 
As the competitive conjecture is consistent even if there is no uncertainty 
about « , it could be anticipated that most of the interest of the extension 
to information transmission suggested here is centred on the other consistent 
* conjecture, c In the analysis of this case we will assume that variations 
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in demand and costs are sufficiently limited for all n firms to produce 
at positive levels. 
Proposition 1 
'Ie 2 (i) c is an increasing function of a • a decreasing function of 
a. 
2 
and an ambiguous function of 2 and a a n 
l'\ g 
lii) The following specific solutions exist in relation to 2 a 
l'\ 
(a) 
-
(b) 
(c) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
2 
a 
n 
-+ 0 
2 
a g 
2 
a 
n+l "g" 
-+-2 2 
a 
a. 
2 
-+ n a g 
" . (n-2) 2 
a 
(!l + -~.l 
2 2 
a 
a. 
If 2 < n k-2 2 a -- a l'\ n-2 g 
exists. 
k 
2 2 
n + a /0 " g a. 
2 
a 
n+l + g 
2 2 
a 
a. 
2 
a 
!l + -f. 
2 2 
a 
a. 
or equivalently 
1 
n 
2 
'Ie 
C 
n-l 
n+l 0 
2 
-1 
n 
15 < 2/n * then c g (-1. n-l) 
c* can take any value between -1 and n-l More precisely. 
for any value c g (-1. n-l) there exists positive finite 
2 2 2 * A n a a a such that c = c a. g l'\ 
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Proof 
The values of k and 0 are simultaneously dependent on the 
parameters of the system. An explicit solution is not possible, but (16) 
and (22) yield, using (5') and (11): 
1 = 
6 
To show that dc*/da2 < 0 
11 
Note that 
= k -
2 
a 
e: 
2 
a (1 
, it is sufficient to show that 
From (36), we have that 
and 
so that 
(36) 
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Since, from (11), > 0 and aO/ak > 0 is increasing 
and c* decreasing in 
The other comparative statics results in (i) can be shown in a 
similar way. 
For part (ii), simply note that 2 o 
T'\ 
k reported in the first 
three columns of the Table satisfy (36). Part (iii) is immediate from row 
(c) of the Table given that c* is monotonic in 2 o 
T'\ 
, as proved above. 
Part (iv) results from rows (a) and (c) of the Table and the continuity of 
c* in 2 o 
T'\ 
The comparative static results in Proposition 1 relate to output 
strategies incorporating information transmission. Thus more uncertainty over 
* the prior predictor'of ~ (02 ) will lead to a higher value of 
~ 
c as 
firms put more reliance on market signals as a whole. Similarly as 2 o 
T'\ 
increases, indicating less information content in output plans, so firms rely 
more on their own private signals and the coherence of the market is reduced. 
The effect of increased variance in the private signal is two~fold; first 
it leads to more reliance on market signals rela.tive to private signals, but 
secondly it leads to more reliance on the prior predictor so that other firms' 
outputs become less important for their information content concerning market 
demand and relatively more important as indicators of market supply. Similarly, 
an unamiguous effect from increasing n is not forthcoming. 
2 show how * 2 2 Figures 1 and c is influenced by 0 and 0 respectively. 
11 a. 
Note that if n > 2 then there is a sufficiently high noise level (sufficiently 
high 2 ) and a suffi<:iently low level of prior uncertainty over the market 0 
11 
n - 1 2 
n - 1 1 
o 
-1 
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c 
'/( 
. FIGURE 1 The Relationship between c 
n - 1 2 
n - 1 1 
-1 
* c 
* FIGURE 2 The Relationship between c and 2 a 
a. 
2 
a 
'1 
2 
a 
a. 
2 
size (0 
a. 
not exist. 
* 
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* 
sufficiently low) that a consistent conjecture C >-1 
Also, note that increasing the number of firms reduces 
c is initially below some positive amount. 
does 
'I< 
C if 
Figure 3 shows (for a set of numerical examples) how * c is affected 
* by the private signal variance 2 o 
e: 
Note that c is little affected 
by quite large changes in 2 o 
e: 
away from extreme values, reflecting the 
confused effect of the greater need for information, as 2 o 
e: 
increased, 
being accompanied by a lower reliance by firms on their private signals 
and thus greater difficulty in extracting information. 
The ambiguous effect of a change in n arise because when 
is small it is as if firms pool their information. With pooled information, 
the variance of the total signal s. 
~ 
is decreasing in n implying that 
c* is increasing in n when 0 is close to lin 
The specific solution (ii. a) in Proposition 1 deserves some comments. 
In this case it is as if firms simultaneously collude over their choice of 
quantities * (c == n - 1) and pool their information 1 (6 = In) With 
0
2 
close to zero, Q_ i becomes a sufficient statistic for t Sand ~ j+i j 
the apparent pooling of information follows using theorem 1 in McKelvey 
and Page (1986). The apparent collusion occurs since, with less noise in 
the signal S· i , firms are more. heartened/disheartened by the observed 
Q and thus, as 
-i 
2 
o 
'1 gets smaller, move more and more in unison. In 
this special .caseinformation is imparted fully and involuntarily through 
announced plans. This is in contrast to the models of voluntary information 
sharing (see e.g. Clarke (1983» where firms do not want to share information 
unless they may cooperate over strategies. 
!. 
*: '.:' 
c 
+1 
" -1 
" 
-:176..-
··i 
* FIGURE 3.a The relation between c 
* c 
n 
and 2 af'l. - .2. 1. 2 
. '. 
FIGURE 3.b The relation between 
and 2 oil - .2, 1. 2 
and '02 • for 
£: 
. 2 
,0 
r'\ 
n • 2 
.2 
2 0" ~ .1 
for n - 10 
,. .• 2 
.. ' 
2. 20 
'a. • 
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Proposition 2 
'I< 
In an equilibrium with consistent conjectural variation c ,aggregate 
output Q , individual firm output q. 
1 
, and the expected profit 
of firm i before the signals are received,'are respectively 
no + ot 
n I Q = - ex. E (Si - ~) 2 2 i=l 
n 
E(I1.) 
1 
(ii) (38) 0 (ot _ ! qi = - ~ + A(S! - ~) + A) " E (S~ - .~) 2 1 2 n .. , J j=l 
where A = ot(on-l) > 0 for l/n < 0 < 2/n (n-1)(2-on) (39) 
(iii) 2 o 
ex. 
1] 2 4 0 11 
providing all n firms produce at positive levels. 
n 
Proof: sum (32) over all i , note that E Q = 
i=l -i 
for Q to obtain (i). To derive (ii), subtract qj 
to obtain 
(40) 
In-1)Q and solve 
from q. using (34) 
1 
q - q = (on~l)ot [(S' - a) i j G i (S' _ ~)] _ 2-0(n+1) ( ) j ~ G qi - qj 
solving yields 
.. 
(S' j (41) 
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Summing over all j and dividing by n yields 
1 n , 
q. = A[(5 ~ - ~) - - ~ (5. - ~)] + Q/N 
1 1 n . 1 J J= 
substituting for Q from (i) "yields (ii) 
To show (iii), note that the price-cost margin for the ith firm is 
Pi = a - Q - 11i 
Using Q from (i) above allows Pi to be written purely in terms of the 
random variables a, Ei and 11i 
no at n 
Pi = a - 2 a - 2 1: (5i - 'Ci) - 11i 
i=l 
(42) 
Then combining (38) and (42) and taking unconditional expectations gives 
E(lli) = E{(a _ no -;;: _ ot 
2 2 
n 
1: 
j=l 
(5' - 'Ci) - 11 ) j i, 
<! 'Ci + A(5i ~ 'Ci) + (~t - A) ~ ~ (5' - 'Ci»} j=l j 
Rearranging yields (40).-
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To see why the assumption that all n firms 
is necessary, 
0 2 -+ - =) 
n 
where 
note that 
A-+co and 
n 
Il = 1: 
j=l 
co 
qi -+ a. t -+-Il n n 
- co 
(S~ - ~)/n 
J 
if 
if 
if 
produce at a positive level 
(S! - ~) ) Il 1 
(S' - ~) = Il i 
(S' i - ~) < Il 
'/( 
and from Proposition l(ii.c)6 -+2/n =) C -+:'1 Thus as we approach the 
competitive conjecture, the output levels given in (38) are not bounded. 
As 0 -+ 2/n only the firm receiving the most encouraging signals will 
produce and supply the whole market. We will return to this question at 
-the end of this section when considering the competitive conjecture. 
The equilibrium associated with the * c conjecture described in 
Proposition 2 is a function of all the information in the supplying 
industry. As we have assumed qi) 0 Vi E(n i ) > 0 Vi is also 
implied in the absence of fixed costs. Before considering the comparative 
statics of the equilibrium it is useful to speculate how it could be 
achieved, given the information'transmission which has to occur. In 
Proposition 3 a simple adjustment proce,ss of firms' plans is shown to 
lead to the- equilibrium plans and outputs whatever the initial announcements. 
Proposition 3. 
From any initial announced positive output plans, there exists a continuous 
adjustment process whereby the industry reaches the equilibrium defined by 
~roposition 2. 
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Proof. Consider that firms adjust their planned output levels towards 
that indicated as ideal by their reaction function. That is: 
q• = (u + vS i' + wQ .) - q. -1 1 Vi 
where implies differential with respect to time. 
Now write these equations in vector form as 
q- t + Wq 
where the typical (ith) element of it is dq./dt 
1 
, that of 
(43) 
(44) 
is 
, that of q is , and W is an n x n matrix with a 
principal-diagonal of elements equal to -1 and all off-diagonal elements 
7/ 
equal to w The only eigenvalues of Ware -(1 + w) and wn - (l+w) 
Since 
2-0(n+1) 
w = G = 2-o(n+1) (h-1)0 + (n-2)(2-(n+1)0) 
the eigenvalues are 
and 
(n-l)(2-no) 
G 
2(1-on) 
G 
respectively. Since ! < 0 < ~ 
n n G > 0 (l-on) < 0 and (2-no) > 0 
Thus both eigenvalues are negative and the system converges to the equilibrium 
stated in Proposition 2 • 
. , 
Although other dynamic adjustment processes may not be stable, cases 
of instability may also occur in situations without information transmission. 
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There appears to be no particular added difficulty of reaching an 
equilibrium in the present analysis. 
Proposition 4 
* Ex ante of any signals being received, the c conjecture yields an 
equilibrium with the following characteristics 
(ii) 
(iii) 
E(Q) -- noa d i i . The expected industry output is 2 an s ncreaslng 
in n. and 2 o 
n 
, and decreasing in 2 o 
a 
The expected output per firm is E(q) 
in a and 0 2 and decreasing in n 
n 
= oa/2 and is increasing 
and 0 2 
a 
The expected price-cost margin is E(p) = ~(l - no/2) and is 
increasing in a and 2 o and decreasing in 
a 
n and 2 o 
n 
E(q) and E(p) are found by taking expectations of (37), 
(38) and (42) respectively. Differentiation, using (36) yields the 
comparative static results. 
Proposition 4 shows that the average effect ~f greater 0 2 or smaller 
a 
0
2 is to move the industry towards a more coherent structure with associated 
n 
lower industry supply and higher price-cost margins. 
* Although the c conjecture and its associated equilibrium is the main 
focus of our analysis, the competitive consistent conjecture is also of 
interest. However in this case, our assumption of always-active firms which 
removed some technical complications in our discussion of the * c conjectural 
equilibrium, is no longer appropriate. We can in fact state the following 
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proposition. 
Proposition 5. 
For the consistent conjecture c = -1 , the following is almost always 
true 
( ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
Only one firm supplies the market 
This firm is the one which has received the most encouraging 
signal, 5i = a + £i - k~i ' where k = (t6)-l 
This firm will produce just sufficient to deter the firm, 
which receives the second most encouraging signal, from 
producing. 
If the number of potential supplying firms is finite the 
expected profit of any firm prior to receiving the informational 
signals is positive in the absence of fixed costs. 
Proof. Part (i) For any assumed industry output Q > q. , the i th firm 
1 
expects product price to be independent of its own output. Given its 
information it expects product price net of its revealed constant marginal 
costs to be: 
as k - (t6)-1 
t(05 i + (1-6)5'.) + (l-t)~ - n. - Q -1 1 
No equilibrium can exist with 
(45) 
pe > 0 unless all output i 
is produced by firm i since firm i conjectures that all other firms 
will make room for any expansion in output. This is almost always true as 
the probability of two firms observing the same composite signal, 
5' - S - kn iii leading to the possibility of sharing the market, is zero. 
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Further, any announcement of an output level which will supply the 
whole market is credible. If firm i- is not the receiver of the most 
encouraging composite signal, then its announced output level will be such 
that there exists a firm j e for which p. > 0 
J 
th Part (ii). Using (45) we can write the difference between the i and 
jth firm's net price expectation, given their respective information signals, 
as: 
As 15 G: 1. 
n 
= t(& - 1-&)- (S' - S') 
n-l i j 
P~ ~ p; as S~ ~ S' 
1 j 
(46) 
Part (iii). If firm i increases its output until all other firms have 
reduced their output to zero and if ,-then firm i is in 
equilibrium. For other firms to be in equilibrium, we must have 
e ~-O V j.L • Pj" r 1 
Part (iv). Ex ante of the signals being received, firms are identical. 
Thus they have the chance of being the sole supplier to the market. As 
e Pi > 0 for the sole supplier, it makes positive profit while the profit 
of the other firms are zero in the absence of fixed costs. Hence the 
expected profit ex ante of the signals is positive. 
Note the similarity between the firms' problem in this case and that 
faced by bidders in an 'open ascending bid (English) auction when bidding for 
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an indivisible good with a common value. Such auctions, where bidders 
are uncertain about the value estimates but can infer other bidders' 
information from their bidding behaviour, have been studied by Milgrom 
and Weber (1982). 
Secondly note that the firm producing is the most encouraged by its 
own composite signal and that this need not be the lowest cost firm. A 
two-firm case is shown in Figure 4 below, where although firm 2 has the 
lower costs, firm 1 will produce in equilibrium. 
Q 
FIGURE 4 : The. "Winning" Firm with Competitive Conjectures. 
This leads to a third point. If firm 1 announces a high output, some 
firms may make no' announcement and firm 1 may never obtain the information 
which could be collected from their participation. In an extreme case if 
firm 1 announces that it intends to produce Ql ,it finds that it has 
all the market. If the monopoly output level is less than QI ,firm 1 
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will announce reductions in output until firm 2 enters the market. Firm 
1 will then increase its output to slightly above Q2 and will be in 
equilibrium. However this equilibrium will only' reflect the signals 
s' 1 and s' 2 and not other firms' information (except insofar as they 
announce zero supply). A different starting point may yield more 
precise information from a larger set of interested firms and thus a 
different equilibrium since both Ql and Q2 are likely to be affected. 
* With the c conjecture, the same kind of problems may occur 
* when c is sufficiently near -1 Obviously, the bigger the variances 
* of costs the more potentially heterogeneous the firms and the nearer c 
ia to -1 These two factors combine to make the assumption that all 
firms produce positive outputs less appropriate when only very noisy 
signals are transmitted. Although the essential character of the analysis 
would not be much affected if some firms produced zero output in equilibrium, 
the study of * c conjectures near to -1 would obviously benefit from 
a reformulation of the model, particu~arly the introduction of increasing 
marginal costs. As our interest in this paper has been to present a 
justification for positive consistent conjectures which occur where signals 
are relatively unnoisy and costs fairly similar, we have retained the 
simplicity of the constant cost model. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
An explanation for the cohesiveness of market supply has been 
advanced which is based on the transmission'of information via quantity 
plans. Firms' conjectural variations take account of the signal which 
will be extracted by the rest of the industry from raising their intended 
supplies. Such conjectural variations can be positive and still 
consistent with observed responses in any experiment. The concept of 
consistent conjectural variations has thus been extended to situations 
where the competitive conjecture is inappropriate. 
* The conjecture c is determined by the underlying parameters 
of the model (see Proposition 1). It increases as a firm's prior estimate 
becomes less reliable (02 increases) and as information transmission 
a. 
2 becomes less noisy (0 decreases). Thus as the information content of 
11 
quantity signals become more needed and more efficient, so the industry 
becomes more collusive in character, and (from Proposition 4) expected 
industry output decreases and expected price-cost margins increase. 
Many assumptions, such as linear demand, homogeneous products and 
constant costs, contributed to the tractability of the analysis. Of more 
significance was the assumption that all firms in the industry contributed 
positive output in equilibrium with the * c corijecture. As the competitive 
conjecture led to only one firm supplying the market (Proposition 5), it 
would seem likely that as * c became near -1 so this assumption would 
become less tenable. However, no such problems are likely to occur when 
the parameters of the model determine * c at positive levels. Finally, 
it has been assumed that only current announced plans can be put into effect. 
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Thus firms cannot announce a plan to produce one level of output while 
actually producing another. 
The model outlined in this paper could be extended to relax a number 
of these assumptions in order to apply the underlying thesis to a wide 
selection of problems. Possible examples might include an extension to 
monopolistic competition where conjectural variations are a determinant of 
whether too many or too few products are produced in a Chamberlinian 
equilibrium (see Koenker and Perry, 1981, and Ireland, 1983). Also 
conjectural variations have been proposed (under a number of names) as a 
determinant of individual labour supply within a workers' cooperative; 
perhaps information transmission concerning rewards for work or required 
standards could be used to explain the level of conjectural responses to 
variations in individuals' labour supply. Further extensions relate to 
the inclusion of risk averseness of firms, where information transmission 
would have the secondary effect of reducing risk. It is hoped to explore 
these extensions in future research. 
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1. The reason for focussing attention on a one-stage game is its 
usefulness as a benchmark. With imperfect information, repeated 
games give rise to additional issues such as the formation of 
reputations, making the notion of information transfer more complicated, 
and to some extent obscuring the interpretation of results. 
2. Consistent conjectures are discussed in Boyer and Moreaux (1983), 
Kalai and Stanford (1985), Kamien and Schwartz (1983), Perry (1982) 
and Ulph (1983). The use of conjectural variations has a long history 
dating from Frisch (1933). 
3. One might even reject the notion of a conjectural variation in a 
one-stage game with simultaneous strategy choices. As argued in 
Daughety (1985), if a chosen strategy is irrevocable, it cannot 
react to the revelation of other players' strategies. This would 
be the case in a model without communication of any kind prior to 
the strategy choice. Firms would then hold point-certainty beliefs 
about the strategy choice of the other firms and optimise 
accordingly. Thus it is hardly surprising that the only equilibrium 
is of the Cournot type. For an extensive treatment, see Daughety 
(1985) . 
4. An alternative scenario would rely on the infeasibility of any firm 
announcing a false plan. Then (i) firms obtain their private 
information; (ii) they announce~hat they truthfully plan to produce; 
(iii) firms infer additional information from the truthful plans of 
others; (iv) based on their augmented information set, firms . 
simultaneously choose their output levels. Both scenarios yield the 
. same outcome but. are predicated on different assumptions. That in 
the text relies on the assumptions that firms cannot deviate from 
final plans but that no plan is final until all firms are in 
equilibrium. The alternative outlined above relies on plans always 
being true representations of firms' intentions. 
5. The ttTendency Survey for Manufacturing Industries" in Denmark is 
fairly typical. Results are calculated from about 700 major 
manufacturing enterprises representing 607. of total manufacturing 
employment, and relate to some 70 market groups. 
6. Equation (4) is true not only for normal errors but also for a range 
of other distributions. See Ericson (1969). 
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7. Note that an n-square matrix with all elements equal to l/n is 
idempotent and thus has eigenvalues of 0 and 1 only. Thus a 
matrix with all elements equal to w has eigenvalues equal to 0 and 
nw only and so the eigenvalues of Ware these values minus (l+w) 
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CHAPTER VII. 
General Conclusion 
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Some general conclusions to emerge are firstly that the effect 
of private information and information transmission in the 
context of oligoipoly models is ambiguous. This. to some extend 
negative. result implies that one should be careful when using 
the results of these models to draw policy conclusions. This is 
clear from the analysis in chapter II and III. where we showed 
that the commment by Clarke(1983b). that information sharing is 
only preferred by firms if they can also collude over 
strategies. and therefore information sharing is proof of 
collusion. is not generally true. This potential reversal of 
the results of the literature also indicate that the results of 
the models are non-robust to changes in the functional forms. 
Secondly. models which under certainty are relatively simple. 
can get quite complicated once uncertainty and private 
information is introduced (as can be seen from e.g. chapters IV 
and V). Further. these models which allows for private 
information also allows a broader range of results as shown in 
chapter VI. One is then left with a feeling that by careful 
choice of functional forms. information structures and 
stochastic specifications. almost any result could be shown. 
This suggests 'that models should be selected on the basis of 
empirical analysis. The final conclusion to emerge from this 
study is that. although this may be very true. taking 
uncertainty and private information as a datum implies that 
equations may have to~be estimated by non-standard methods and 
that non-standard tests may have to be used. It certainly gives 
yet more reasbns for testing the assumptions underlying the 
-192-' 
estimation procedure and tests. This is most clearly brought 
out by the analysis in chapters IV and V. Here under certainty 
the model mimicks the Cournot oligopoly model. Once uncertainty 
is introduced this is no longer true. We find that market 
shares not only are random but also that the market share of 
different firms in the same industry may follow different 
distributions. This have serious implications if we want to use 
market shares as explanatory variables in econometric models. 
because ordinary least squares need no longer be unbiased and 
efficient. Thus it is necessary to convince oneself that the 
explanatory variables are deterministic and to test the implied 
assumptions regarding the error term. Further if we take the 
existence of mixed strategies serious. and if we want to 
explain price-cost margins. then these will almost surely not 
follow a normal distribution. This implies that standard tests 
are at most asymptotically valid and hence that tests for 
normality are essential. Finally the functional forms of the 
equations to be estimated should be based on models where the 
likely sources of uncertainty are taken explicitely into 
consideration. rather than based on deterministic models. and 
estimators consistent with the derived stochastic structure 
(e.g. maximum likel(hood) should be used. 
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